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THE, UNITED STATES-FRENCH INCOME
TAX CONVENTION
HERBERT I. LAZEROW*
INCOME tax conventions have been used by the United States for
nearly forty years1 to relieve double taxation and prevent evasion
of taxes. Recent conventions manifest a change in the terms for which
the United States presses in treaties with other "developed" countries.
This article will attempt to analyze the provisions of the most recent
tax convention negotiated by the United States and France in order
to set forth the meaning of terms and phrases that are likely to be used
often in future United States tax conventions.
The 1967 Convention will be a particularly important tool for analyz-
ing future income tax conventions. It is the first convention with a
developed country negotiated in the light of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development Draft,3 a model convention drafted
primarily by European countries to harmonize their tax systems Sec-
* Assistant Dean and Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.
1. The first tax convention concluded by the United States was with France in 1932. For
a discussion thereof, see McCaffery, The Franco-American Convention Relative to Double
Taxation, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 382 (1936) [hereinafter cited as McCaffery].
2. Convention with the French Republic with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property,
July 28, 1967, [1968] 4 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.AS. No. 6518 (effective Aug. 11, 1968) (hereinafter
cited as 1967 Convention]. This convention can also be found at 1 CCH Tax Treaties S 2839
(1968). The 1967 Convention supersedes the Convention and Protocol with the French
Republic Respecting Double Taxation, July 25, 1939, 59 Stat. 893 (1945), T.S. No. 988
(effective Jan. 1, 1945) [hereinafter cited as 1945 Convention and 1945 Convention Protocol,
respectively], as supplemented, Convention and Supplementary Protocol with France Respect-
ing Double Taxation and Taxes on Estates, Inheritances, and Income, and Modifying and
Supplementing the Convention of July 25, 1939, Oct. 18, 1946, supplementary protocol signed
May 17, 1948, 64 Stat. B4 (1950-51), T.I.A.S. No. 1982 (effective Jan. 1, 1950) [hereinafter
cited as 1945 Convention Supplementary Protocol], as supplemented, Convention with the
French Republic Supplementing the Conventions of July 25, 1939 and October 18, 1946,
Relating to the Avoidance of Double Taxation, as Modified and Supplemented by the
Protocol of May 17, 1948, June 22, 1956, [1957] 1 U.S.T. 843, T.I.A.S. No. 3844 (effective
June 13, 1957). The 1945 Convention can also be found at I CCH Tax Treaties U 2803
(1970).
3. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Fiscal Committee, Report,
Draft Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income
and Capital (1963) (hereinafter cited as OECD Draft], reprinted at 1 CCH Tax Treaties
ff 151 (1966). See Remarks of Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to the
American Chamber of Commerce Abroad, at Washington, D.C., April 30, 1968, Treas. Dep't
Release No. F-1228, at 2 (April 30, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Chamber Talk].
4. The United States and Canada were not strong voices in the development of the OECD
Draft, and there are many places where it meshes poorly with the domestic tax concepts of
the United States. OECD Draft 19; Tillinghast, The Revision of the Income Tax Convention
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ond, it is the first complete convention negotiated by the United States
with an eye firmly fixed on the new system of taxing nonresident aliens
and foreign corporations established in 1966 by the Foreign Investors
Tax Act.5 Third, it is the first complete convention negotiated with a
country using an integrated taxing system for corporate income taxation
and for dividends distributed by corporations. This system has the same
effect as a split tax rate in that it is more advantageous from a tax point
of view to distribute dividends than to retain earnings in the corpora-
tion.6 The French system, because it gives relief to the shareholders
rather than the corporation,7 is perhaps the most difficult of these sys-
tems to neutralize. Fourth, the contracting states use different unilateral
measures for the relief of double taxation. France relies primarily on
the exemption method,' while the United States uses the credit method.'
Adjusting these disparate systems is more difficult than harmonizing
similar methods. Finally, the 1967 Convention will set the pattern for
a major round of negotiations and renegotiations with other developed
nations.'0
I. GENERAL RULES
The 1967 Convention changes the general pattern of our income tax
conventions in certain respects. Business profits" of a resident of one
between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 21 Tax L. Rev. 399 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Tillinghast]. But see Kragen, Taxation Treaties: The O.E.C.D. Draft,
52 Calif. L. Rev. 306, 308 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Kragen].
5. Act of Nov. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539 [hereinafter cited as Foreign
Investors Act]. See J. Chommie, Federal Income Taxation §§ 213-15 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Chommie]; S. Roberts & W. Warren, Foreign Investors Tax Act (1967); Note, The
Bases for Taxing Foreign Corporations and Nonresident Alien Individuals on Income from
Sources Within and Without the United States, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 1261 (1968).
6. Germany uses a split rate (which reaches the same result by a different theory),
Harvard Law School, World Tax Series, Taxation in Germany 143 (1963), but the renegotia-
tion with Germany was only a partial one. Norr, The French Reform of Dividend Taxation
and Common Market Tax Harmonization, 44 Taxes 320 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Norr];
Tillinghast 400-01.
7. Norr 321; Tillinghast 400 n.5.
8. Harvard Law School, World Tax Series, Taxation in France § 11/2.18a (1966) [herein-
after cited as France].
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 901-06.
10. Negotiations are now in progress or have been completed with Belgium, Finland,
Japan, Portugal and Spain, among others, and these negotiations will take or have taken
the 1967 Convention as their model. Treas. Dep't Release No. F-1331 (Aug. 21, 1968);
Chamber Talk 3. There are also negotiations taking place with several less Industrialized
nations. Many of the clauses in United States tax conventions with industrialized countries
are copied in conventions with developing nations. Discussions with Treasury Department
officials indicate that plans for comprehensive convention regulations have been abandoned.
Instead, regulations under the 1967 Convention will serve as a model for other regulations.
11. The term "business profits" is used throughout this article in place of the term
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country earned in the other country are taxable in the source country
only to the extent that they are effectively connected with a permanent
establishment located therein. Investment income is generally entitled to
exemption from tax or reduced rates in the source country, except that
investment income which is effectively connected with a permanent es-
tablishment is taxed as business profits. 2 A new feature of income tax
conventions appears in the 1967 Convention, namely, that royalties are
taxable in the source country to prevent tax evasion. The 1967 Con-
vention also contains more liberal provisions than the 1945 Convention
concerning income from personal services (including income of teachers,
students and trainees)."' The spirit of administrative assistance strongly
evident in all tax conventions continues in the 1967 Convention. Double
taxation is relieved for United States citizens, residents and corporations
by the credit mechanism, and for French residents and corporations, by
a combination of the credit and exemption methods, with the emphasis
on the credit method.
II. COVERAGE
The 1967 Convention applies to all income taxes imposed by the con-
tracting states, 15 including the personal holding company tax and the
accumulated earnings tax. 6 The enumeration of taxes indicates that the
"industrial or commercial profits" because the latter term can be misleading. "Industrial or
commercial profits" include "income derived from manufacturing, mercantile, agricultural,
fishing, or mining activities, from the operation of ships or aircraft, from the furnishing
of personal services, from the rental of tangible personal property, and from insurance
activities and rents or royalties derived from motion picture films, films or tapes of radio
or television broadcasting," 1967 Convention, art. 6(5), much of which is neither industrial
nor commercial, but is normally considered business profits. The term "business profits" is
also shorter, thereby being an easier term to use.
12. See text accompanying notes 266-318 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 322-34 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 335-426 infra.
15. 1967 Convention, art. 1(1).
16. The personal holding company tax (Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 541-47) is clearly an
income tax. The accumulated earnings tax (Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 531-37) is not, but
its position in Subtitle A of the Code, "Income Taxes," argues for inclusion as an income
tax. More significantly, the 1967 Convention specifically refers to both taxes in Article
13(1)(b). Specific inclusion is not unusual. See Convention and Protocol with Canada
Respecting Double Taxation, March 4, 1942, arL XIII, 56 Stat. 1399 (1942), T.S. No. 983
(effective retroactively Jan. 1, 1941), 1 CCH Tax Treaties U 1219 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Canadian Convention and Canadian Convention Protocol, respectively], as amended,
Convention Modifying and Supplementing the Convention and Accompanying Protocol of
March 4, 1942, June 12, 1950, art. I(h), [1951] 2 U.S.T. 2235, T.I.A.S. No. 2347 (effective
Nov. 21, 1951), as supplemented, Convention with Canada Further Modifying and Supple-
menting the Convention and Accompanying Protocol of March 4, 1942 for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion in the Case of Income Taxes, as
Modified by the Supplementary Convention of June 12, 1950, Aug. 8, 1956, [1957] 2 U.S.T.
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term "income taxes" include surtaxes17 and surcharges.18 Thus, resi-
dents of convention partners with fixed limits on United States taxes
will be the only ones to escape the Vietnam-related surcharges." This
1619, T.I.A.S. No. 3915 (effective Sept. 26, 1957); Convention with United Kingdom
Respecting Double Taxation and Taxes on Income and Protocol, April 16, 1945, art. XVI,
60 Stat. 1377 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1546 (effective retroactively Jan. 1, 1945), 2 CCH Tax
Treaties ff 8121 (1964) [hereinafter cited as United Kingdom Convention], as amended,
Supplementary Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Signed at Washington
on the 16th April, 1945, as Modified by Supplementary Protocol, Signed at Washington on the
6th June, 1946, May 25, 1954, [1955] 1 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 3165 (effective Jan. 19, 1955),
as amended, Supplementary Protocol with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Signed at Washington on
the 16th April 1945, as Modified by the Supplementary Protocol Signed at Washington on
the 6th June 1946 and by the Supplementary Protocol Signed at Washington on the 25th
May 1954, Aug. 19, 1957, [1958] 1 U.S.T. 1329, T.I.A.S. No. 4124 (effective Oct. 15, 1958),
as amended, Supplementary Protocol with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Signed
at Washington on the 16 April, 1945, as Modified by the Supplementary Protocols Signed In
Washington on the 6th June, 1946, the 25th May, 1954, and the 19th August, 1957, March 17,
1966, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 1254, T.I.A.S. No. 6089 (effective Sept. 9, 1966) [hereinafter cited
as United Kingdom Supplementary Protocol].
It has been argued that many tax conventions implicitly include these taxes by indirection
when they exempt from United States tax, dividends and interest paid by foreign corporations
to nonresident aliens or foreign corporations. S. Roberts & W. Warren, U.S. Income Taxation
of Foreign Corporations & Nonresident Aliens 11 X/6B(1) (a) (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Foreign Tax]. The argument is that a foreign corporation may only be subject to the
accumulated earnings tax if its shareholders are subject to United States income tax. Id.
ff X/2A-2B(2); Alexander, Foreign Personal Holding Companies and Foreign Corporations
That Are Personal Holding Companies, 67 Yale L.J. 1173, 1174, 1194, 1196 (1958). This
argument depends largely on the application of the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio aterius
to Treas. Reg. § 1.532-1(c) (1960). The validity of this interpretation depends on the view
that the accumulated earnings tax is only intended to thwart avoidance of United States
income tax by the shareholder, a view which the United States Senate did not share In its
reservation to the income tax conventions with Ireland. S. Exec. Rep. No. 1, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1951); 97 Cong. Rec. 11,458 (1951). Nor did it share this view in its reservation
to the United States income tax convention with the Netherlands. S. Exec. Rep. No. 11,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948); 94 Cong. Rec. 8625 (1948). However, the Senate's ratification
of the 1967 Convention argues the other way, as does Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 542(c) (7),
which provides that a foreign corporation wholly owned by nonresident alien Individuals Is
not a personal holding company.
17. 1967 Convention, art. 1(1) (a). One example would be the surtax on corporations
provided by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 11.
18. S. Exec. Doc. N, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. V (1967). This is logical since a surcharge
on income is a federal income tax under Article 1(1) (a) of the 1967 Convention, or because
it is an identical or substantially similar tax under Article 1(3) of the 1967 Convention.
19. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 51.
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type of coverage is proper and should continue in other tax conventions.
Although it can be argued that when one makes investments in a coun-
try, he partakes of the benefits provided by that government and, there-
fore, should support it, surcharges and surtaxes are usually only imposed
as a result of some national crisis. To the extent that foreign investors
have placed investment funds in a country in reliance on a fixed limita-
tion in the rate of tax or exemption from tax, this expectancy should
not be disturbed. The same rationale would also apply to a business
which is not conducted through a permanent establishment.
The 1967 Convention also has provisions dealing with withholding
and estimated taxes. 0 One of the reasons proffered for reduced rates
and exemptions from tax is that the administrative work required of
individuals in ascertaining and paying the tax is not justified because
of their minimal economic penetration of the source country. If with-
holding and estimated taxes were imposed regardless of an exemption
from or reduction in the rate of tax for which they provide payment,
the taxpayer would be put to a double burden of paying the withholding
and estimated tax, and then having to file for an appropriate refund.
The weight of this justification is slight. The additional work required
to file a claim for refund, where the taxpayer's only income from abroad
is from investment income, is minimal. The danger of evasion from a
withholding system such as the United States uses, relying on the tax-
payer's address to reduce withholding, is grave. However, the danger
of evasion is minimized in France because shares of stock are generally
held by French banks, which collect the tax where appropriate and pay
it over to the United States. It is apparently quite difficult to cash a
dividend check in France, because of the specific identification that it
has, without going through a bank that would be familiar with with-
holding rules. Although adequate weighing of these policies, along with
the ease of administration provided by reduced withholding, should call
for a system of full withholding followed by claims for refunds, the
United States interprets all of its tax conventions to require reduced
withholding, and the 1967 Convention will be no exception.
The 1967 Convention also applies to the French tax on stock exchange
20. 1967 Convention, art. 1(1)(b)(i) specifically mentions the French precompte, and
1967 Convention, arts. 31(1)(a)(i)-(b)(i) & 32(1)(a)-(2)(a) refer specifically to both
French and United States withholding taxes. Even in the absence of a specific reference,
withholding taxes should be included. Subtitle A of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 is entitled
"Income Taxes" and includes the provisions for withholding of tax on investment income, and
Chapter 24, which provides for withholding of tax on wages, is entitled "Collection of Income
Tax at Source on Wages.' The Commissioner has consistently considered himself bound in
imposing withholding taxes by the convention limitations on the imposition of income tax.
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 510.4(b) (1) (1960).
1971]
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transactions, 21 and to any documentary taxes on the transfer of securi-
ties which might be imposed after the signing of the convention.22 The
French registration tax on incorporation into capital of undistributed
profits is also covered by the new convention.23 It is unusual to include
such excise provisions in an income tax convention. However, this is not
precedent for extending the scope of United States tax conventions, as
it stems from a series of specific difficulties we have had with France,
rather than from a goal related to the operation of tax conventions.
For purposes of the nondiscrimination provision only, the new con-
vention applies to all taxes, whether imposed at the national, state, or
local level.2 4 This provision is quite common in United States tax con-
ventions25 and is rather remarkable in that it restricts the taxing rights
of our fifty states, as it assures that they accord national treatment in
taxation to residents of the convention partner. The United States, on
the other hand, generally secures the inclusion of all foreign income
taxes, as many foreign governments have no local levies.20 The Treasury
Department has been reluctant to restrict the ability of the states to
tax foreign residents. As the inhibition is not based on constitutional
strictures, 7 it must be attributed to political considerations. It is per-
21. 1967 Convention, art. 1(1) (b) (ii). See France § 4/10.5, at 252-53.
22. 1967 Convention, art. 1(2). This clause seems designed to assure that United States
stock transfer taxes, which were repealed in 1965 by the Excise Tax Reduction Act, are never
reimposed on French residents. Act of June 21, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 401, 79 Stat. 136.
23. 1967 Convention, art. 13(2)(b).
24. Id., art. 1(4). Hearings on Exec. Doc. N., Tax Convention with France, Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
25. E.g., Convention with the Republic of Austria for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 25, 1956, art. XVIII, [1957] 2 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S.
No. 3923 (effective retroactively Jan. 1, 1957), 1 CCH Tax Treaties ff 521 (1957); Con-
vention with the Republic of Honduras for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, June 25, 1956, art. XX (5),
[1957] 1 U.S.T. 219, T.I.A.S. No. 3766 (effective retroactively Jan. 1, 1957) (terminated
Dec. 31, 1966 by Honduras). However, it was not found in the old convention, where the
nondiscrimination provision was limited to income and stock transfer taxes. 1945 Conven-
tion Protocol, art. V.
26. Where foreign local taxes are significant, the negotiators try to cover them. See Con-
vention with the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect
to Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, art. I(1)(b), [1951] 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316
(effective Sept. 27, 1951), 2 CCH Tax Treaties ff 7404 (1968), which covers Swiss cantonal
and communal taxes.
27. U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Scandinavian
Airlines Sys., Inc., v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 37-42, 363 P.2d 25, 40-44, 14
Cal. Rptr. 25, 40-44 (1961) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961). There
is no greater constitutional support for the provision requiring national treatment than
[Vol. 39
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haps thought just to equalize the tax burdens of local and foreign enter-
prises through a national treatment clause, but unjust to local enterprises
to grant a reduced rate or exemption to foreigners.28 As will be seen
later, 9 state and local income taxes should at least be covered under
the personal services provisions of the 1967 Convention.
The operative term of the 1945 Convention with respect to business
income was "enterprise. °'a ° The old convention specifically defined the
term to include a partnership.3' Thus, two Panamanian citizens might
form a United States partnership to obtain business profits from France
without tax. Since the partnership would not be taxed in the United
States 3 2 and the partners were not taxed by the United States," the
only tax imposed on the French income would be Panama's. This pro-
vision allowed aliens to gain the benefits of the convention simply by
forming a United States partnership. The Treasury has attempted to
plug this loophole by regulation,.' but has not done so with France.35
there is for a provision exempting foreign residents from state tax entirely on certain types
of income.
Limitation on state taxation of foreign corporations and nonresident aliens covered by a
tax convention is indirectly achieved where a state income tax law begins with federal ad-
justed gross income. See, e.g., N.Y. Tax Law §§ 605(2)(c), 631(a) & 632 (McKinney Supp.
1970) ; Foreign Tax f IX/8C. But this exemption is at the will of the state, not the federal,
government.
28. The advantage is more apparent than real, since most of our tax convention partners
impose substantial taxes on the foreign income of their residents. In view of this, the foreign
enterprise would not gain a competitive advantage over United States firms. France is an
exception, as it exempts from its tax the foreign income of French corporations. France
§ 11/2.18a.
29. See text accompanying notes 355-56 infra.
30. 1945 Convention, art. 3. The term "enterprise" is a word of art in French domestic
law-a generic term for business entities. It would include corporations, partnerships, sole
proprietorships, trusts, and other entities carrying on business. For the definition in another
context, see Lazerow, Price Discrimination and the Treaty of Rome: The Jurisdictional
Elements, 23 Fed. BJ. 147, 162-64 (1963).
31. 1945 Convention Protocol, art. M(b).
32. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 701; Foreign Tax U VI/4E.
33. The United States taxes the income of nonresident aliens only to the extent that it is
derived from sources within the United States, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 871, 872(a), or
to the extent that it constitutes certain kinds of income effectively connected with a trade
or business in the United States carried on by the alien through a fixed place of business.
Id. § 864(c)(4). The Foreign Investors Act does not change this result. S. Roberts & W.
Warren, Foreign Investors Tax Act S/7 (1967) (supplement to Foreign Tax).
34. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 504.120(c) (1960).
35. French partnerships are treated in the same fashion as United States partnerships-
the partner is taxed on his allocated share of the income, whether distributed or not. France
§ 5/3.1. like United States partnerships before 1969, French partnerships may elect to be
taxed as corporations. Id.
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In the new convention, the operative term is "resident" for all arti-
cles. A resident of the United States is defined as a United States cor-
poration and any person (other than a corporation) "who is resident
in the United States for purposes of its tax .... ,, Residents of France
are defined similarly, mutatis mutandis.17 The new convention's defini-
tion of resident is awkward under the laws of both nations. Neither coun-
try's tax law considers partnerships either resident or nonresident,
except where such partnerships are taxed as corporations.
A similar problem applies to trusts and estates. The United States
classifies trusts and estates as either resident or nonresident, with resi-
dent foreign trusts being subjected to liability for world-wide income."
The defining of residence in the case of foreign trusts is one of the most
difficult problems of United States law, and depends on the residence of
the trustee, the grantor, the beneficiaries, the situs of the trust corpus
and the investments of the trust.8 However, with France, the problem
is considerably simpler. There is no such thing under French domestic
law as a resident trust or estate for tax purposes. The institution of the
trust does not exist40 and the estate is not a taxable entity.41 Each heir
is taxed on his aliquot share of the income from the estate. Although it
is not quite clear, foreign trusts are normally taxed in France on a "pass-
through" basis. Their distributions are taxed to the beneficiaries as divi-
dends. Where the beneficiary can establish that he cannot reach the
income, it will be taxed to the trust.42
Moreover, things are complicated by the United States system of tax-
ing trusts. Simple trusts are taxed as conduits, with their income taxed
to the beneficiaries.43 Complex trusts are taxed as conduits when the
36. 1967 Convention, art. 3(2) (b). This is a big improvement on the former standard
convention provisions that defined United States resident as a "United States corporation or
other entity." For problems inherent in this definition, see Foreign Tax 1 IX/OF.
37. 1967 Convention, art. 3(1).
38. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(a)(31) defines a foreign trust or estate as one not
subject to United States tax on world-wide income. Section 641(a) taxes trusts In the same
manner as individuals, and from section 871 we learn that nonresident alien individuals aro
not taxed on their world-wide income. It is thus concluded that nonresident trusts and es-
tates are foreign trusts and estates.
39. Harvard Law School, World Tax Series, Taxation in the United States § 11/4.9, at
1103-04 (1963); Foreign Tax f1 II/5A-5B; Hammerman, Foreign Situs Trusts-Defining
the Undefined, 38 Taxes 529 (1960).
40. There is the institution of the usufruct, which is more like the common law use be-
fore the Statute of Uses or, in substance, a legal life estate. See generally McClean, The
Common Law Life Estate and the Civil Law Usufruct: A Comparative Study, 12 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 649 (1963). Income is generally taxed to the beneficiary. France § 5/3.4.
41. France § 5/3.5.
42. See id. § 11/2.14.
43. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 99 651-52 ; Chommie § 127, at 316.
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income is distributed to the beneficiaries in the year earned, 4" and under
other special conditions; 4" otherwise, the trusts themselves are taxed.40
Thus, it is hard to know whether the better result would be to apply
the conduit theory to trusts, and treat them like a partnership, or apply
the taxable entity theory, or attempt to vary the treaty consequences
with domestic law. The third solution would probably be best for United
States trusts.
None of the above is specified in most United States tax conventions.47
United States domestic tax regulations have adopted the conduit theory
for nonresident beneficiaries of domestic trusts, tying it strictly to the
conduit provisions of its domestic law,48 but operating in different
ways for partnerships and trusts. 49 In this respect, the 1967 Convention
is superior. The definition of "resident of the United States" states that
a person acting as a partner or fiduciary is a resident "only to the ex-
tent that the income derived by such person in that capacity is taxed as
the income of a resident."' 0 Under this definition, the characterization
as a resident is taken from the taxable entity. For example, a trust
taxable to the beneficiaries under United States domestic law is consid-
ered a resident of the United States only to the extent that the benefi-
ciaries thereof are residents. A trust whose income is taxable to the trust
will be a resident of the United States if United States domestic tax
law considers it a resident trust. It is unfortunate that the same defini-
tion is not applied to French residents in the 1967 Convention. Although
France avoids the problem of trusts and estates, this would provide
some convention language to base "passing-through" characterization
from the partners to the partnership. Since France ignores the partner-
ship entity and only imposes tax on the partners, they can reach the
same result through use of Article 2 of the new convention, which
provides that terms not otherwise defined shall have the same meaning
as they have under the domestic tax laws of the contracting states. How-
ever, such a solution is less satisfactory than a specific convention pro-
vision because of the additional certainty the latter provides for tax-
payers. This result, of course, requires the like attribution of any perma-
nent establishment of a partnership to its partners,6' and a permanent
44. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 661-63; Chommie § 131, at 323-24.
45. Tnt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 665-68; Chommie § 131, at 324-26.
46. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 661-63; Chommie § 131, at 323-24.
47. It has been argued that the regulation's result is justified by the context. Foreign
Tax f IX/IOF.
48. Treas. Reg. § 514.7 (1957).
49. Compare Tres. Reg. § 510.119(a) (1960), with Treas. Reg. § 510.120(c) (1960).
50. 1967 Convention, art. 3(2) (b).
51. See text accompanying notes 144-204 infra. The OECD Draft avoids this problem
1971]
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establishment of a trust or estate to its beneficiaries. Income tax regula-
tions have long (and incorrectly, in this writer's opinion) been cited
against this proposition,52 but the Treasury has made the attribution"8
and has received both judicial 4 and legislative support. 55
The new convention creates a problem of double residence for corpora-
tions but solves one for individuals. Under the Protocol to the 1945
Convention, a French corporation was defined as a corporation created
or organized under the laws of France.50 Since this is the reciprocal
definition of a United States corporation, no corporation could be
resident of both countries, as a corporation could not be created or
organized under both the law of the United States and France. The new
convention retains the same definition of United States corporations"7
but changes the definition of a French corporation to a corporation
"which is resident within France for French tax purposes."'5 8 Technically,
however, no corporation is resident within France for French tax pur-
poses. France divides corporations into French corporations and foreign
corporations. It appears that the terms "French" and "foreign" desig-
nate what the United States would refer to as resident and nonresident
corporations.5" Since a corporation is resident in France for French tax
purposes when, and only if, its actual head office is located in France, 0
a corporation organized under the laws of one of the United States having
its head office in France is a corporation, and therefore, a resident of
both contracting states.61 Such a corporation would only receive the
by confining the term resident to a person liable to tax in a state by reason of his domicile,
residence, or place of management therein. OECD Draft, art. 4(1). Since partnerships are not
subject to any tax, this definition peers through to the partners.
52. The regulation that has often been cited is Treas. Reg. § 1.871-8(c) (1964), which
reads: "Neither the beneficiary nor the grantor of a trust ... is deemed to be engaged in
trade or business within the United States merely because the trustee is engaged In trade
or business within the United States." It has been interpreted to prohibit the attribution of
characteristics from a trust to its beneficiaries. This reading overlooks the word "merely",
which should indicate that something more will suffice to attribute the trustee's status to the
beneficiaries. That additional something is the taxability of trust income, via the conduit
principle, to the beneficiaries. In Ed & Jim Fleitz, Inc., 50 T.C. 384 (1968), the tax court
took a similar position on the word "merely" appearing in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a) (5).
53. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 504.120(c) (1960).
54. W.C. Johnston, 24 T.C. 920 (1955).
55. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 875(2).
56. 1945 Convention Protocol, art. III(d),(e).
57. 1967 Convention, art. 2(1) (d)(i).
58. Id., art. 2(1)(d)(ii); Foreign Tax ff IX/10E(1).
59. France § 11/2.2a, at 714 n.16.
60. Id. § 11/2.2a, at 713-14.
61. Great Britain provides that a corporation is resident in Britain if it is incorporated
and holds directors' meetings there, although its center of management is elsewhere. Swedish
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benefits of the nondiscrimination and relief of double taxation articles of
new convention. 2
The OECD Draft solves the problem by the usual continental rule-
a corporation is a resident of the country in which its place of effective
management is located.a This rule is supported by two theories. The
first theory is that the tax burden on a corporation should be determined
by the substance of its activities rather than its arbitrary choice of a
jurisdiction in which to incorporate.64 Since most countries tax income
from sources within their borders even as to nonresident corporations,"'
this argument is not very persuasive as the source of income is some-
times an arbitrary company choice. More persuasive is the fact that, as
with an individual, the government of allegiance, to which a corporation
renders tax on its world-wide income, should be determined on the basis
of substantive activities rather than formalities. A second theory is that
a great deal of income is in fact produced by the managerial skill of
the place of effective management. Therefore, the country in which that
management lies should tax that income. This argument is of dubious
validity in view of the common practice of sourcing income other than
in accordance with the place of effective management. On the other hand,
there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in calling a corporation a
resident of the state which issued its charter. This would permit a cor-
poration to pick a country of residence without regard for any substan-
tive connection to that country. However, such a rule has the advantage
of clarity and would be easy to apply. It does not require determining
which office represents the place of effective management, as the manage-
ment of a great many corporations is diffused. 6 Either solution, however,
is preferable to the current one in trying to avoid dual residence. How-
ever, a change of either definition would raise the problem of according
Cent. Ry. v. Thompson, [19251 A.C. 495, 508; Harvard Law School, World Tax Series,
Taxation in the United Kingdom § 5/2.2, at 124-25 (1951) [hereinafter cited as United
Kingdom]. Contra A. Ehrenzweig & F. Koch, Income Tax Treaties 69 (1950); Great Britain
also provides that a corporation is a resident of Great Britain if its center of management
is there although it is incorporated elsewhere. De Beers Consol. Mines Ltd. v. Howe, [1906]
A.C. 455; A. Ehrenzweig & F. Koch, supra at 68-70; United Kingdom § 5/2.2, at 124.
62. 1967 Convention, art. 22(4)(a).
63. OECD Draft, art. 4(1). In view of United States domestic tax law, it is not surprising
that the United States entered a reservation to this paragraph.
64. De Beers Consol. Mines Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] A.C. 455.
65. See, e.g., France § 11/3.4, at 754.
66. This problem does not appear to have arisen much in Europe, perhaps due to the
smaller size of European businesses. The possibilities are illustrated by the distinction in
French domestic tax law between siege social fictif, the place designated in the charter as the
head office, and seige social effectif, the place where effective management is centered. Id.
§ 11/2.2, at 714.
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convention benefits on one basis and taxing world-wide income on
another. This can lead to establishing an unintentional tax haven. For
example, if the definition of a French corporation were changed to one
incorporated in France, a French corporation managed and controlled
from Panama would receive convention benefits but would not be subject
to French taxation as a resident.17 As unwarranted exemptions are more
of a prevalent problem than possible dual residence, the new convention
has properly weighed the considerations 8 in its change of the definition
of the term "French corporation."
A recurrent problem under tax conventions has been defining the status
of individuals who have substantial contacts with both contracting
states. The 1945 Convention evaded the problem by refusing to define
the term "resident," thereby incorporating the domestic law of each
contracting state to determine whether an individual is resident therein.09
The new convention provides that where an individual is, under the
domestic law of each country, a resident of both countries, he shall be
considered a resident of the country in which he maintains his perma-
nent home. If an individual does not maintain a permanent home, he
shall be considered a resident of the country in which he has his center
of vital interests; or in default thereof, he shall be considered a resident
of the country in which he has an habitual abode."0 If this fails to resolve
the deadlock, provision is made for mandatory agreement between the
contracting states.71 The new convention defines permanent home as
"the place in which an individual dwells with his family." 72 This defini-
tion raises more questions than it solves problems. Must a bachelor live
with his parents in order to have a permanent home? What of a man
separated from his wife and children? 73 The requirement that the indi-
vidual dwell with his family adds only confusion. The definition of
permanent home may be of help in determining a person's principal
permanent place of residence in the normal case, but cases of double
residence only arise because the fact pattern is abnormal. Family ques-
67. Foreign Tax ff IX/1OD(4).
68. United States officials of long experience report never having problems involving
double residence of corporations.
69. Foreign Tax 1 IX/7A(2)-7B(2); see Treas. Reg., § 514-104 (1946). Deference to
domestic law is specific in article 2(2) of the 1967 Convention. A United States resident 1s
one who is more than a transient or sojourner. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1960).
70. 1967 Convention, art. 3(3).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. A better example might be Joseph P. Kennedy who, while Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, rented an estate near Washington, D.C. in which his wife and
children never lived as they resided in Palm Beach and Hyannisport. R. Whalen, The
Founding Father 156, 161-62 (1964).
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tions aside, it seems that an individual need not own property to have
a permanent home. Commentary on the OECD Draft indicates that the
home need only be "available to him."74 However, it must be available
on a long-term or long-continued lease; otherwise, it will lack the
requisite quality of permanency."
The concept of permanent home should not be confused with the
French doctrine of principal residence. Under French domestic law,
domicile is used to determine whether an individual is subject to tax on
his world-wide income. 7 An alien can only be domiciled in France if
he: (1) has his center of vital interests in France, or (2) has his prin-
cipal residence in France for more than five years.77 Both the United
States and France manifested their intention in the 1967 Convention to
distinguish the two terms by using different French terminology.78 The
difference in meaning is striking. Under French domestic law, an alien
may have a principal residence in France without an establishment of
his own; he may live with friends or in a hotel.7 The significant question
is the amount of time spent in France during a period compared with the
amount of time spent in other places. The concept of permanent home
would seem to require a residence that is owned or leased. However, a
hotel room maintained with some degree of permanency would certainly
qualify. The key to the definition is the relative continuity of maintain-
ance of the facility.
The permanent home distinction will rarely resolve the question of
dual residence. Most people with dual residence are likely to have
permanent homes in both contracting states. If this were the case, then
it would be necessary to consider the center of vital interests test.80
The concept of the center of vital interests has no meaning in United
States domestic law, but it is a term familiar to French tax practitioners
in defining domicile under French law. In France, an individual has his
74. OECD Draft Commentary 68. Interpretations of the OECD Draft are useful in con-
struing provisions modeled after it. Indeed, this is one of its principal functions. Cf. Hearings
14.
75. However, the Internal Revenue Service has espoused a floating crap game theory of
permanency when defining permanent establishment. Compare Rev. RuL 165, 1956-1 Cum.
Bull. 849, with Rev. Rul. 249, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 264.
76. However, an alien is not taxed in France on his foreign income if such income is
taxed by the country of which he is a citizen as part of a tax on his world-wide income.
France § 11/1.2b.
77. Id. § 11/2.1a.
78. Principal residence in French is "sejour principal," and permanent home in the French
language version of the new convention is "un foyer d'habitation permanent." 1967 Con-
vention, art. 3(3) (French language version).
79. France § 11/2.1a, at 711.
80. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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center of vital interests in the place where the major part of his economic
activities are carried out.81 If an alien carries on no economic activities,
the location of the main portion of his wealth determines his center of
vital interests.8 2 Although the French tax administration has contended
that the location of intangible assets is the place of management of that
wealth,"3 the Council of State has recently ruled that an alien who
carried on no business in France and whose wealth consisted of foreign
securities on deposit in a foreign bank did not have his center of vital
interests in France, although he managed the securities himself from
Paris. 4 Therefore, the physical location of the securities, rather than
the place from which the portfolio is managed, determines the center of
vital interests.
The French concept of vital interests and the one used in the new
convention are not the same. The provision found in the new convention
is taken from the OECD Draft, and the Commentary accompanying
the Draft indicates that the center of vital interests is the country "with
which his personal and economic interests are closest.185 This implies a
broader scope than the French concept, which is confined solely to
economic interests, and requires a determination of the total context of
the individual's interests, both personal and economic. The new conven-
tion reinforces this interpretation.86
The third test for resolving cases of dual residence is the state in
which the individual maintains an habitual abode. 7 If the preceding tests
are unable to resolve the controversy, it is unlikely that the habitual
abode test will be of any help. Any individual with a permanent home
in both contracting states or with a situation that precludes determining
which of two contracting states is the center of his vital interests is
likely to have an habitual abode in both contracting states. On the other
hand, it is conceivable that an individual with a permanent home in
neither contracting state and for whom neither contracting state is the
center of his vital interests may have an habitual abode in only one of
the contracting states. The terms "permanent home" and "habitual
81. France § 11/2.1a, at 711.
82. Id. § 11/2.1a, at 710.
83. Id.
84. Id. It should be noted that although European judicial decisions are not binding on
other courts or even on the same court in the future, there is an exception In the field of
French administrative law, which includes tax law. In this field, the law is developed through
the decisions of the Council of State in a form analogous to the common law In Anglo-Saxon
jurisdictions. Thus, a decision of the Council of State is likely to set a binding precedent.
Id. § 1/3.4e.
85. OECD Draft, art. 4(2) (a).
86. OECD Draft Commentary 68.
87. 1967 Convention, art. 3(3).
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abode" are quite close to each other in practice. Perhaps the chief dis-
tinction is that an individual who habitually lives in a country, but lives
at no place in that country long enough to have the requisite quality of
permanency, would have an habitual abode in that country.
Finally, if none of the above tests are able to resolve the problem of
dual residence, the competent authorities of the contracting states shall
settle the question by mutual agreement. 8 This provision seems to be
mandatory on the competent authorities, but the procedure that an
individual who is charged with having a dual residence would follow, in
forcing the competent authorities to agree on his residence, is not clear
or imaginable. The addition of the mandatory phrase to the residence
article does not supplement the mutual agreement procedure set forth
in Article 25 of the new convention. It may have been inserted in the
article dealing with residence to remind the competent authorities of the
extreme problems faced by an individual who is deemed to be a dual
resident in order to urge them to find a solution.
Despite the problems described above, the adoption of criteria for
resolving dual residence problems is a step toward rationalizing the de-
termination of residency. 9 For the United States, dual residency of
individuals has not been an important problem, but its existence can
result in double taxation of the individual and should, if possible, be
eliminated. However, the new convention does not deal with the problem
of eliminating the occasional problem that occurs where a person is
taxed on his world-wide income by neither contracting state even though
his only contacts are with the two states party to the convention. This
problem usually occurs because the tax systems of the two states have
exemptions that do not completely mesh. This situation was exemplified
in the case of David E. Rose,90 where the taxpayer, a United States
citizen, was exempt from United States tax9' because he was not a
United States resident. His exemption from British tax resulted from the
type of income he received and the method of payment. 2 In this case,
Rose was certainly a British resident.93 The problem was caused by the
unilateral effort of each country to relieve international double taxation
by the exemption method, which sometimes leads to nontaxability in
both countries. The type of situation that occurred in Rose could not
88. Id., arL 3(3).
89. Accord, Kragen 309-10.
90. 16 T.C. 232 (1951).
91. This case was decided under the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 619, § 148(a), S6 Stat.
841 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 911(9) (1)).
92. 16 T.C. at 233.
93. Id. at 238. See, e.g., Miesegaes v. Comm'rs, 37 Tax Cas. 493 (CA. 1957); Flemig
v. Wilkerson, 10 Tax Cas. 416 (CA. 1925).
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arise under the 1967 Convention since France taxes the world-wide
income of its residents, and supplies no unilateral relief by exemption or
credit.9 4
III. BUSINESS PROFITS
The 1967 Convention does not change the general rules for the taxa-
tion of business profits. Under both the old and new conventions, business
profits derived by a resident of one contracting state from sources within
the other contracting state are taxed only to the extent that they are
attributable to a permanent establishment of the resident located in the
source state.95
A. Shipping and Aircraft
Income from the international operation by a resident of one country
of ships and aircraft registered in that country is taxable only in the
country of residence.96 The requirement that the ship or aircraft be
registered in the country of residence does not constitute a change from
the 1945 Convention.9 7 It would, for example, prevent United States
residents (or French residents) who register their ships in Liberia from
receiving the benefits of the new convention. 8 The inclusion of registry
requirements was at the insistence of the United States. It is part of the
policy aimed at encouraging United States registry in order to have air-
craft and vessels available in case of emergency, such as was experienced
in World War II. In addition, denying the tax benefit may partially
offset the economic advantages of foreign registry, namely, not being
94. France § 11/1.2.
95. 1967 Convention, arts. 6(1) & 22(2)(a); 1945 Convention, art. 3; Carroll, Will
Franco-American Tax Treaty Aid Business with France?, 23 Taxes 228, 230 (1945) [thereln-
after cited as Carroll].
96. 1967 Convention, art. 7.
97. 1945 Convention, art. 6. This provision liberalized the prior convention which applied
only to trips between France and the United States. Carroll 231, 233.
98. In some United States tax conventions, there is no requirement that the registry be in
the country of which the owner is a resident. Convention with Norway for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income,
June 13, 1949, art. V., [19513 2 U.S.T. 2323, T.I.A.S. No. 2357 (effective Dec. 11, 1951),
2 CCH Tax Treaties Uf 6103 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Norway Convention], as modified,
Protocol to the Convention with Norway for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Dec. 11, 1951, [19511 2
U.S.T. 2351, T.I.A.S. No. 2357 (effective Jan. 1, 1951) [hereinafter cited as Norway Conven-
tion Protocol]. However, the recent tax conventions have all required it. See, e.g., Conven-
tion with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property,
Dec. 18, 1962, art. V, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726 (effective Jan. 1, 1964), 1 CCH
Tax Treaties ff 5302 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Luxembourg Convention].
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subject to United States labor laws or having to deal with domestic
maritime unions. It is doubtful that the tax loss by lack of convention
benefits is significant enough to alter the decisions of business enter-
prises as to registration of their vessels. The wage savings would seem to
greatly outweigh any possible tax loss. The registry requirement of the
new convention is a deviation from the OECD Draft, which simply
provides that shipping and aircraft profits should be taxable only in the
state in which the place of effective management is situated."
The principal justification for the exemption of shipping and aircraft
profits is the difficulty of allocating profits between the two states, one of
which is the state of departure and the other the state of arrival. The
passenger traffic in both directions will be the same, since most people
take round trips. Although it is possible to attempt to allocate profits on
the basis of the nationality or residence of the passengers, the departure
point of the majority of the cargo, or the country in which the ticket is
sold, it is usually not worth the trouble of allocation where both coun-
tries have strong shipping and aircraft organizations.'
The definition of profits from the operation of ships or aircraft in
international traffic is very broad. It includes profits which, because of
their close connection with transport profits, are difficult to separate
from transport profits.Y' It would include profits from a flight within a
country if that is a continuation of an international flight.10- This is so
regardless of the fact that a passenger may join the plane only for a
domestic flight. However, Air France does not currently take passengers
from point to point within the United States, nor do any United States
carriers do so in France." 3 Other profits included within the term
shipping or aircraft profits include the fully equipped, manned, and sup-
plied charter of a boat or aircraft, the sale of passage tickets on behalf of
other enterprises, operation of a bus service connecting a town with its
99. OECD Draft, art. 8. The United States did not enter a reservation to this article.
OECD Draft Commentary 68.
100. Since shipping and aircraft agreements are also in effect with countries having com-
paratively small sea or air establishments, eg., Agreement with Colombia with Respect to
Relief from Double Taxation on Earnings from Operation of Ships and Aircraft, Aug. 1,
1961, [1961] 3 U.S.T. 3141, TJ.A.S. No. 4916 (effective Dec. 11, 1961), it is apparent that
the amount of passengers or cargo carried by the enterprises of the respective countries is
irrelevant to this determination.
101. OECD Draft Commentary 90.
102. Id.
103. Letter from John C. Pirie, Vice President and General Counsel, Pan American World
Airways, to Herbert I. Lazerow, Sept. 16, 1969; Letter from Stephen Mackevicdus, Legal
Services Manager, Air France, to Herbert I. Lazerow, Sept. 4, 1969; Letter from Paul AL
Ostergard, Attorney, Trans World Airlines, Inc., to Herbert L Lazerow, Sept. 22, 1969.
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airport, and advertising and commercial propaganda profits related to
the shipping and aircraft business. 04 On the other hand, the term does
not include clearly separate activities such as the maintenance of a hotel
(except as an overnight waiting room for passengers), profits from ship
building yards, or other distinctly separate types of enterprises. 10 Thus,
the profits from a package tour to France in a United States airline that
includes stays in various airline-owned downtown hotels would have to
be allocated between the cost of transportation and the cost of the hotel
rooms.'0 6 This provision may become troublesome to apply with the
advent of conglomerates which own both airlines and hotels.' 07
The shipping and aircraft provision deviates from the OECD Draft in
another fashion. The OECD Draft applies the same rule to income from
the operation of boats on inland waterways as is applied to ships in
international commerce. This provision is found in none of the United
States tax conventions, probably because coastal trade has been reserved
to vessels built and registered under the laws of the United States and
owned by United States citizens. 0 8
B. Definition of Business Profits
The definition of business profits in the 1967 Convention is one of the
most important changes from the 1945 Convention. The inclusion in the
new definition of "income derived from manufacturing, mercantile, agri-
cultural, fishing, or mining activities, from the operation of ships or air-
craft, from the furnishing of personal services .... " and from insurance
activities is not exceptional.0 " All of the above are usually considered
the active conduct of a trade of business. 10 They were no doubt in-
cluded within the term "business profits" under the old convention, al-
104. OECD Draft Commentary 90.
105. Id. at 91.
106. Id.
107. Pan American Airways owns a hotel in Paris and another in Tahiti through a
wholly-owned subsidiary. Letter from John C. Pirie, Vice President and General Counsel,
Pan American World Airways, to Herbert I. Lazerow, Sept. 4, 1969. Trans World Airlines
has interests in several French hotels through its subsidiary, Hilton International. Letter from
Paul M. Ostergard, Attorney, Trans World Airlines, Inc., to Herbert I. Lazerow, Sept. 22,
1969. Quaere whether subsidiary profits are included or allocated?
108. Central Vt. Transp. Co. v. Durning, 294 U.S. 33 (1935); 46 U.S.C. § 883 (Supp. V,
1970). Whether a similar prohibition exists in France is unknown to this author. If not,
then the usual rule for business profits would apply. If a United States enterprise engaged
in inland transport in France and had a permanent establishment there, the profits attributable
to that permanent establishment would be taxed by France. It is possible for a shipping or
transport enterprise to operate in one country without having a permanent establishment
there.




though the definition found therein is exclusionary-it simply enunciated
types of income that were not business profits."' However, the inclusion
in business profits of income from rents or royalties derived from motion
picture films and films or tapes of radio or television broadcasts is new. -'
In the old convention, these "cultural" royalties were exempt from tax
in the source country as royalties." 3 The film industry, one of the
strongest lobbying groups behind tax convention negotiation, wanted
royalties from the showing of motion pictures to be included within the
definition of business profits. 114 This desire was based on the fact that
the rate for royalties may vary as countries discover that royalties re-
ceived by their residents from activities conducted in the United States
are at a continual deficit to the royalties received by residents of the
United States from activities conducted in those countries." 6 Since cur-
rent techniques of marketing motion pictures do not require a permanent
establishment in the country in which the pictures are shown, the sub-
mergence of motion picture royalties within the broad category of taxa-
tion of business profits will insulate movie royalties from tax in the
source country.
Movie royalties are a particularly sore point in United States-French
relations. In the early 1950's controversy arose between United States
companies receiving industrial and motion picture royalties from France
and the French tax administration."" France insisted on imposing twice
the taxes of the film "Chiffre d'Affaires" on the payment of movie royal-
ties from French exhibitors to United States picture owners." 7 The
United States companies were operating either through French sub-
sidiaries, which collected the royalty fees from the French exhibitors and
forwarded them to the United States company, or through French
branches which did the. same. Under French domestic law, royalties
derived from the exhibition of films in France are considered to be from
French sources and are subject to the tax on services. Thus, the first tax
on services was paid when the French exhibitor forwarded the royalty to
the French subsidiary or French branch of the United States distributing
company. A second tax on services was levied when the French subsidiary
111. 1945 Convention, art. 3. The OECD Draft takes a third approach by failing to
define the term. OECD Draft, art. 7.
112. 1967 Convention, art. 6(5).
113. 1945 Convention, art. 7.
114. Hearings 15.
115. See text accompanying notes 322-31 infra.
116. S. Exec. Doc. J, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1956).
117. These taxes were the production tax, the transaction tax, and the local additional
tax, which amounted in total to about 9 per cent of the gross royalty payments. By reforms
instituted in 1954, these taxes were changed to the tax on services, and imposed at the same
rate. Id. at 21; France § 14/3.1.
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or branch forwarded the royalty to the United States distributing com-
pany." 8 The United States made elimination of this double taxation and
settlement of past disputes between the United States motion picture
industry and the French taxing authority a prerequisite to completion
of an amendatory convention to the 1945 Convention in 1956.110 The
agreement worked out by the motion picture industry and the French
tax administration provided that where the United States company
operates through a branch in France which is a permanent establish-
ment or operates without a permanent establishment in France, the tax
on services would be applied only on the payment of royalties from the
exhibitor to the collector of the royalties in France. No tax on services
would be imposed on the remission of the royalties to the United States. '2
The incorporation of rentals from motion pictures within the definition
of business profits in the 1967 Convention enables the motion picture
distributors to combine an advantageous tax provision for the tax on
services with one that excludes income taxation of business profits by
having no permanent establishment in France. 2' The United States will
probably press for such a provision in negotiations concerning future tax
conventions.
The rental of tangible personal property is a second change from the
1945 Convention definition of business profits. This type of income was
specifically excluded from the definition of business profits' 2  in the old
convention, so its inclusion in business profits is new in the 1967 Con-
vention.123 The position of these rentals had been puzzling. There was
no reference to the taxation of these items elsewhere in the old conven-
tion and its legislative history provided that items not specifically treated
in other articles would be taxed under the domestic law of each
country. 24 French domestic law would include income from the rental
of personal property within the heading of business income' 20 which,
if it is from business activity in France, is taxed to nonresident aliens
and foreign corporations. 2 The United States also taxed this rental
income to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations, since it is United
118. S. Exec. Doc. J, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1956).
119. Id. at 4.
120. For a complete discussion of the agreements, see id. at 15-34.
121. Although the documents which rely on the old convention expired, the French delega-
tion assured the United States delegation that the abrogation "would not entail any important
tax consequences." S. Exec. Doc. N, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1967).
122. 1945 Convention, art. 3(d).
123. 1967 Convention, art. 6(5).
124. S. Exec. Rep. No. 7, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9-10 (1940).
125. France § 7/1.1b.
126. Id. § 11/3-3.
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States source income.127 If the income was not derived through a trade
or business carried on in the United States, it was taxed at the rate of 30
percent or the normal rate, whichever was greater." Therefore, the old
convention deprived income from the rental of tangible personalty of
the benefits of both investment income and business profits. Thus, the
inclusion in the new convention of this item in business profits is the
most sensible treatment and comports to the domestic law of both con-
tracting states. It wil result in the taxation of such rental income in the
source country only when it is effectively connected with a permanent
establishment.
It can be argued that income from the rental of tangible personalty
is only business income when it is done on a large scale basis, such as the
rental of automobiles, copying machines, and computers. The rental by
an individual of one, or a small number, of objects is more like invest-
ment income or the rental of real property. In the United States, there
exists the phenomenon of "investment credit" leases, where wealthy
individuals buy airlines, railroad cars, and similar property, financing
them to 80 percent of the cost with insurance companies, and leasing
them to the user. No such schemes have appeared internationally for
several reasons. Among the reasons are that the arrangement might be
subject to the Interest Equalization Tax2 0 or Foreign Direct Investment
Regulations. 130 For whatever reason, there appears to be no known
"investment" rentals of tangible personalty abroad, which probably
explains the simplicity of the provision in the new convention.
Under the new convention, the business profits of a permanent estab-
lishment are to be computed as though it were an independent entity
dealing at arm's length with its home office. 13' This provision is com-
pletely reworked from the old convention, where the authorities had the
right to make such corrections in the income declarations as were neces-
sary to demonstrate the exact profits. 32 However, there is no change in
substance between the two conventions.
The new convention specifically allows expenses of earning the income
to be deducted from the profits of the permanent establishment Such
127. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 871(a) (1).
128. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 871(a) (), (b)(1), 68A Stat. 278-79 (now Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 871(a) (1), (b)(1)).
129. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 4911-20.
130. 3 C.F.R. § 437 (1970), promulgated pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11,387, 33 Fed. Reg.
47 (Jan. 3, 1968). See Lancaster, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: A Look at Ad
Hoc Rulemaking, 55 Va. L. Rev. 83, 115-17 (1969).
131. 1967 Convention, art. 6(2).
132. 1945 Convention, art. 4.
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expenses include appropriate shares of executive and general administra-
tive expenses, regardless of the place in which they are incurred.8 3
These allocation provisions have been criticized as being too indefinite
to be of much value.1"' It is true that they do not constitute a complete
allocation system, but they are a first step toward a more comprehensive
system. The United States domestic system is only comprehensive with
respect to certain types of income.135 Parts of it have, however, been used
informally under this provision by foreign governments, thereby creating
a common practice in international allocation.1 3
Finally, there is specifically excluded from the definition of business
profits any amounts arising from the purchase of goods or merchandise
by the permanent establishment or the home office for the account of
either party.8 7 Some countries consider the purchase of goods within the
country and their transportation out of the country as income from
sources within that country and, if a permanent establishment otherwise
exists, will tax that income to it.338 Although there has never been any
problem in this regard with France, French law does provide that in
case of a buying office in France, where the income may not be readily
ascertained from its books or records, the office will be taxed "on the
basis of the income that would have been earned by an independent
firm rendering a similar service."' 9 With the strength of the United
States concept of realization as a prerequisite to the recognition of any
income, it is beneficial to include such a provision in the income tax
coventions of the United States. In addition, it constitutes a source rule
of sorts which will encourage uniformity in taxation between the two
nations. 4 9
C. Definition of Permanent Establishment
The definition of permanent establishment has been modernized to
conform to recent United States tax conventions and the provisions of
the OECD Draft.'4 ' The new convention makes substantial changes in
the definition or permanent establishment where a party deals through
133. 1967 Convention, art. 6(3).
134. Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in Relieving Double Taxation,
17 Rutgers L. Rev. 428, 440-41 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Owens].
135. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1 to -2 (1968).
136. Foreign governments are, however, unwilling to accept the many "safe harbors" in
those regulations.
137. 1967 Convention, art. 6(4).
138. One example is India. Harvard Law School, World Tax Series, Taxation in India
§ 11/1.2b (1960).
139. France § 11/3.6b, at 763.
140. Owens 440.
141. OECD Draft, art. 5.
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an agent, is in the insurance business, or is in the construction or as-
sembly business. Another change in the definition is the exclusion of
certain types of fixed places of business from the definition. It also
resolves ambiguities in the OECD Draft. The new convention permits
substantially greater economic penetration before a permanent establish-
ment is found.1'
The function of the concept of permanent establishment is to exclude
an enterprise from taxation in another country unless it has sufficient
economic penetration to justify the expense and trouble of imposing that
country's tax upon it. Under the old convention, the required degree of
penetration was achieved whenever the enterprise had a fixed place of
business in the source country 43 There followed an enumeration of
things that were commonly considered to be a fixed place of business
such as branches, plantations, factories, workshops, stores, offices, agen-
cies, warehouses, mines and oil wells . 44 The same definition is carried
over into the new convention with the addition of a seat of management
as a fixed place of business. 45 One is forced to speculate about the kind
of business that would have a seat of management abroad, but no office.' 0
The source of this provision is the OECD Draft, which provides that a
place of management is a permanent establishment.147 When a similar
provision was incorporated in the United States-Luxembourg income tax
convention, 148 an exchange of letters interpreted it to require a continuous
place of management, 49 and excluded from the scope of management,
142. See Tillinghast 432.
143. But see S. Exec. Doc. J, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1956), which states that a branch
without power to negotiate and conclude contracts is not a permanent establishment. This is
inconsistent with 1945 Convention Protocol, art. II(a) which provided: "The term 'per-
manent establishment' includes branches... and other fixed places of business .. . 2'
144. 1945 Convention Protocol, art. In(a). At that time there was no definition of
"branch" in the United States domestic law, but such a definition did exist when the new
convention was being negotiated. Treas. Reg. § 1.963-1(f) (4) (i) (1964). It is doubtful that
either country considered this definition when negotiating the new convention.
145. 1967 Convention, art. 4(2).
146. This was the intention of the OECD Draft. OECD Draft Commentary 72. Foreign
Tax ff IX/12F(1) (a), suggests it was intended to strike at the use of residential property,
either a home or hotel, for management decisions. But this would seem to render the residence
an office by definition, "the directing headquarters of an enterprise or organization," Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 1567 (1967).
147. OECD Draft, art. 5(2) (a).
148. Luxembourg Convention, art. II(1) (f) (ii) (A).
149. S. Exec. Rep. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-44 (1964). Similar commentary is found
in the memorandum of understanding appended to the German Convention, providing that
a hotel room or similar temporary place will not be a place of management. Hearings on
S. Exec. Doc. G and S. Exec. Doc. I before the Subcomm. on the Convention with the Federal
Republic of Germany on Double Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1965) [hereinafter cited as German Hearings].
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decisions of a technical nature.5 ° The use of the term "seat" instead of
"place" seems to be an attempt to imply a requirement of continuity of
management. It can also be assumed that the technical exclusion would
apply to the new convention because of a presumption of uniformity of
interpretation of similar provisions.
Under the domestic tax law of France, a place of management does not
constitute a permanent establishment.'51 Therefore, there is less danger
that occasional use by the parent's officers of a subsidiary's offices would
constitute a permanent establishment. Provisions added to United States
domestic law by the Foreign Investors Tax Act defined an office or other
fixed place of business with some specificity,' which was further refined
by recently proposed regulations. 5 3 Although it is doubtful that these
provisions were considered in drafting the 1967 Convention, they will
probably be used where consistent with prior interpretation of similar
tax convention clauses.
Even though a place of business may constitute a fixed place of busi-
ness (and thus a permanent establishment under normal circumstances),
if it is used only for certain activities the fixed place of business will not
be considered a permanent establishment. These activities fall into four
categories. 15 4 The first category is the storage, display, or delivery of
goods belonging to the resident.'5 5 The second is the maintenance of
goods belonging to the resident for the purpose of processing by another.
The purchase of goods for the account of the resident is the third
category.1 6 The fourth category is collection or supply of information,
advertising, scientific research, or activities of a preparatory nature for
the resident.'57 The new convention makes it clear that a resident may
engage in all of these activities at a fixed place of business, without it
being defined as a permanent establishment.5 8
150. Secretary Surrey added the technical exclusion in his testimony on the new con-
vention. German Hearings 21.
151. See France § 11/3.5. Unlike France, under German domestic tax law a place of
management constitutes a permanent establishment. Tillinghast 431-32.
152. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 864(c) (5).
153. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.864-7, 34 Fed. Reg. 1030, 1038 (1969).
154. 1967 Convention, art. 4(3).
155. Id. art. 4(3) (a). Drawing the line between these activities and selling may be quite
difficult.
156. The 1945 Convention expressly included purchasing offices within the definition of
permanent establishment. 1945 Convention Protocol, art. III(a).
157. 1967 Convention, art. 4(3). The exemption for preparatory activities applies only to
activities to forward the enterprise's work, not to activities that are sold to others. OECD
Draft Commentary 74-75. In the 1920's, Canada tried to tax income from mail sales derived
from Canadian advertising. Carroll, International Tax Law, 2 Int'l Law. 692, 700 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as International Tax Law].




The above activities are excluded from the scope of permanent estab-
lishment because they are all relatively minor or preparatory to the
earning of income' 59 In the case of preparatory work, the activities are
so far in advance of the realization of profits as to not call for charac-
terization of the enterprise as a permanent establishment.lc' With pur-
chases, the exclusion of a purchasing office from permanent establishment
is a counterpart to the exclusion from business profits of income from the
purchase of goods.1 1 In the other cases, the activities may be carried on
through a fixed place of business in such a small degree as to make it
unwise to tax enterprise's business profits in the source country because
of its limited penetration. The amount of income likely to be derived does
not justify the tax harrassment to the enterprise. The theory seems to
be that the sale is the crucial income-producing item. The finding of a
permanent establishment cannot, however, be defeated by requiring ac-
ceptance of the sales contract at the home office.16 2 This would elevate
form over substance to an intolerable degree. It also ignores the concept
of the complete cycle in French law. A foreign enterprise with no con-
tacts in France other than its carrying on a complete commercial cycle is
taxed on its profits from that cycle.1( This provision, combined with the
substance over form argument familiar to United States tax lawyers,"'
might well rule out a combination of otherwise permitted activities.
Under French domestic law, the complete commercial cycle is the per-
formance of all activities necessary for earning the profit within the
jurisdiction. 65 Where the enterprise purchased goods in France, had
them processed in France under contract with an independent party, had
them stored and displayed in France, and took orders in France subject
to the approval of the home office in the United States, this should be
considered so great an activity within France as to constitute the branch
The United States had been inclined to this view, subject to contrary interpretation by the
OECD. S. Exec. Rep. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 64 (1964).
159. See OECD Draft Commentary 74.
160. However, there has been some unhappiness in European circles at the extensive
activities of some American propaganda offices. See Kragen 314.
161. See text accompanying notes 127-40 supra. But cf. the old convention where pur-
chasing income is not business profits, 1945 Convention, art. 3, but a purchasing office was
a permanent establishment, 1945 Convention Protocol, art. m(a).
162. Tillinghast 432-33; see Rev. Rul. 31, 1962-1 Cum. Bull. 367 (similar interpretation
of the United Kingdom Convention). There is language supporting both sides in the OECD
Draft Commentary. OECD Draft Commentary 75.
163. France § 11/3.5d; Taxation of Branches in France, 2 Eur. Taxation 103, 106 (1962).
Likewise, income from the performance by a French enterprise of a complete commercial
cycle outside France is exempt from French tax. France § 11/2.4d.
164. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 US. 716 (1929).
165. France § 11/3.5d. Contra, Taxation of Branches in France, 2 Eur. Taxation 103, 106
(1962) and Taxation of Branches in France, 8 Eur. Taxation 167 (1968), which require that
the complete cycle be carried on habitually, rather than occasionally.
19711
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
as a permanent establishment.16 6 Of course, the general rule of French
law, that treaties are superior to domestic law, would ordinarily preclude
the finding of a permanent establishment.'07 But where the substance is
the same as a permanent establishment, except for the requirement of
final approval by the home office, the substance of the arrangement should
govern (particularly when the likelihood of home office disapproval is
minimal). This ordinary tendency to prefer substance over form is
heightened by the finding of a complete commercial cycle.
Where there is less of a complete business cycle, such as in a case
where goods are purchased or manufactured in the United States with
the goods being displayed and the orders taken in France, the reinforcing
effect of the complete commercial cycle disappears, and the more difficult
question arises of whether substance over form is sufficient, by itself, to
overrule the specific convention provision permitting these activities.
Although each case will probably be decided on its own facts, one sus-
pects that where the branch is making sales in France, with approval of
the home office being given as a matter of course, the branch will be
considered to have exceeded its display function and will constitute a
permanent establishment.
The exclusionary provisions are less important today, since the enter-
prise is only taxed in the source country on profits attributable to or
effectively connected with the permanent establishment. Under the old
convention, the presence of a permanent establishment resulted in all
earnings being taxed in the source country.""8
Under the old convention, where there was no fixed place of business,
but the enterprise dealt through an agent established in the United
States, 6 9 sufficient penetration existed to constitute a permanent estab-
lishment when the agent had general authority to negotiate and conclude
contracts, or maintained a stock of merchandise from which he regularly
filled orders. 7 ' However, operation through a bona fide broker or com-
mission agent was excluded. 7' This exclusion was justified by the
166. Tillinghast 433.
167. France § 11/4.5.
168. 1945 Convention, arts. 3, 7 & 11.
169. The transitory presence of such an agent is insufficient; he must be established here.
Foreign Tax ff IX/12G(1)(b). This casts doubt on the correctness of Rev. Rul. 249, 1960-2
Cum. Bull. 264, which provided that the federal government could withhold income of a
transitory agent in the absence of definite information.
170. 1945 Convention Protocol, art. flI(a). For construction thereof, see Foreign Tax
U IX/12G(2).
171. The 1967 Convention adds a requirement that the agent must act in the ordinary
course of his business to maintain the exemption. Compare 1967 Convention, art. 4(5), with




:rationale that operation through an independent party usually indicated
a relatively small operation that had not achieved sufficient economic
penetration within the source country. 2 Practicality in administration
also supported this exclusion. Profit would be difficult to determine, since
the agent only knew the gross sales consummated for the principal.173
The new convention eliminates from the concept of permanent establish-
ment the agent who maintains a stock of goods from which orders are
regularly filled.174 Such a change follows logically from the exclusion
from permanent establishment of fixed places of business devoted to the
display, storage, or delivery of goods.171
Under the old convention, the agent need only have possessed authority
to have constituted a permanent establishment."' The new convention
requires the habitual exercise of that authority,77 thereby changing the
determination from one of theoretical power to one of actual exercise of
power. This is an easier determination to make. The type of authority
necessary to constitute a permanent establishment has also changed.
The old convention required general authority to negotiate and conclude
contracts. 78 The new convention calls only for authority to conclude con-
tracts in the name of the principal. This provision is adopted from Article
5 (4) of the OECD Draft, which reasons that an agency with power to
bind the foreign enterprise to contracts is a sufficient economic penetra-
tion of the country to constitute a permanent establishment.'7
Another change from the old convention with regard to agency con-
cerns an agent who has, and habitually exercises, authority to enter into
contracts on behalf of the enterprise. In the new convention, such an
agent will not constitute a permanent establishment if the authority is
limited to the purchase of goods for the enterprise.'80 This is analogous
to the provision excepting from the definition of a permanant establish-
ment a fixed place of business devoted solely to the purchase of goods.18'
172. However, Great Britain, shortly after World War I, imposed a tax when sales through
an independent agent became sufficiently repetitive to constitute trading. Carroll 700. Opposi-
tion to this practice resulted in the general shape of present definitions of permanent estab-
lishient. L.N. Doc. C. 562.M.178.1928. 2, at 12 (1928). For a more precise discussion of the
independent agent requirement, see Foreign Tax ff IX/12G(4)-(6) ; Short, Permanent Estab-
lishment and Agencies, 11 Can. Tax J. 387 (1963).
173. Carroll 330.
174. 1967 Convention, arts. 4(3) (b) & 4(4).
175. Id., art. 4(3) (a), (b); cf. OECD Draft Commentary 76.
176. 1945 Convention Protocol, art. 111(a).
177. 1967 Convention, art. 4(4) (a).
178. For a definition of general authority, see Foreign Tax ff IX/12G(1) (c).
179. OECD Draft Commentary 75.
180. 1967 Convention, art. 4(4) (a).
181. See text accompanying note 156 supra.
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If such a fixed place of business is not a permanent establishment, an
agency that only purchases goods should not be either.
As related to agency, the question of whether a foreign concern can
eliminate the permanent establishment by requiring approval of all con-
tracts at the home office is the same as that incurred under the specific
exceptions from the fixed place of business,15 2 and should be solved in
the same manner. Though the commentary to the OECD Draft, like the
Delphic oracle, points in both directions,'183 the most sensible solution
would require an examination of the actual state of affairs. If the agent's
essential occupation is selling, and the contracts are approved as sub-
mitted in most of the cases, he should be considered to have the requisite
authority to constitute a permanent establishment. On the other hand,
if the home office often makes substantial modifications of the contract,
he should not be so treated.
Another major change from the old convention in the definition of
permanent establishment relates to insurance companies. Formerly, an
insurance company had a permanent establishment in a state if it re-
ceived premiums from or insured risks in that state.184 The result of this
definition was to tax all income from insurance of French risks in
France, 18 5 regardless of how small an establishment the insurance com-
pany maintained there. Under the new convention, an insurance company
that does not have a fixed place of business in a country may have a
permanent establishment there if it receives premiums from or insures
risks in that territory through a representative other than an independent
agent. 80 This permits the company to do some business in the country
without having a permanent establishment, as long as its operations are
not too extensive. Presumably, the term "independent agent" refers to
a commission broker arrangement, not simply an independent contractor
in the master-servant sense. This provision is likely to have little effect
on United States life insurance companies because these companies do
business directly abroad, preferring to operate through subsidiaries, if
at all. However, many United States life insurance companies reinsure
foreign risks, and would be operating abroad, usually through dependent
agents. 18 7
182. See text accompanying notes 162-67 supra.
183. OECD Draft Commentary 75.
184. 1945 Convention Protocol, art. 111(a).
185. The provision doesn't tax insurance premiums from United States risks of French
companies, since United States tax conventions cannot increase United States tax. Under the
domestic law of the United States, the source of insurance premium income is the place
where the contract is negotiated. Foreign Tax ff VI/4D(3).
186. 1967 Convention, art. 4(7).
187. Letter from George Gingold, Attorney, Aetna Life & Casualty Co., to Herbert 1.
Lazerow, Dec. 24, 1968.
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Most domestic insurance operations would have to be considered de-
pendent operations because they. are so closely tied to one company. Any
agent who places in excess of 80 percent of his policies with one company
should not be considered a general commission agent. Where, in addition,
the company exercises other controls over the agent, the agent is certainly
dependent.188 Insurance problems have always called forth special atten-
tion from France, so this clause is unlikely to appear in other United
States tax conventions.
The final change in the definition of permanent establishment provides
that a resident of one country has a permanent establishment in the other
country if the resident has a person in the other country who maintains
substantial equipment or machinery in the source country for a period of
at least twelve months. 8 9 This provision, which expands upon the
OECD Draft,90 does not specify whether a site maintained for less than
twelve months is a permanent establishment, 9 ' but the better interpreta-
tion of the provision is that it intends to draw a line that is easy to apply,
with a one year cut-off. Whether the provision is a liberalization or
tightening of the old rule is difficult to determine. First, it can be argued
that sufficient continuity of presence is established for other fixed places
and for agency agreements without them persisting for a year. A con-
struction site would normally be a permanent establishment whenever
it is as continuous as other types of permanent establishments, but the
new convention liberalizes this term by requiring twelve months' dura-
188. A description of the general and district agency as they operate in the United States
would be useful here: "The general agency is operated by an individual, usually a successful
agent for the company. Many of the large individual and group policies are written by the
general agencies. The general agent's status is unclear. He appears to be an agent but he is
far from being independent. The company signs the lease for the general agent's office space
but he contributes toward the rent in accordance with a predetermined formula. The general
agent hires his own subagents but they must be approved by the company. According to his
contract with the company the general agent must place all his life, annuity, and accident and
health business with the [company], if the company desires to take it.
"The company prefers that the general agent only deal in the lines of insurance carried by
the company. If one of his clients desires casualty insurance, or if the company does not
approve an application for a life, annuity or accident and health policy, the general agent is
free to place the business elsewhere. In the same way the general agent obtains business from
other companies' agents.
"A large volume in smaller life insurance polities are written by the district agents of the
district agencies. These agencies are located in space rented by the company. The agency is
managed by an employee of the company and the agents are employees of the company.
This is quite apparent when you realize that the district agents have their own union which
bargains with the company." Letter from Ronald W. Fox, Attorney, John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Co., to Herbert I. Lazerow, Dec. 27, 1968.
189. 1967 Convention, art. 4(4)(b).
190. OECD Draft, art. 5(4).
191. OECD Draft Commentary 73.
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tion. Second, the construction site provision appears as one of a series
of examples of permanent establishments, each of which is a fixed place
of business.'92 Third, there is a weak statement in the legislative history
of the Canadian Tax Convention,1 3 made in support of a provision
making any construction site a permanent establishment, that the new
language was clarifying and did not change prior law. 1 4 Finally, it has
been suggested 95 that two Revenue Rulings' 9 support this view. How-
ever, this is a doubtful position, since their express rationale looks else-
where. In addition, the Canadian situation is sui generis. United States
enterprises would often conduct logging operations in Canada during the
logging season. These enterprises contended that their operations did not
constitute a permanent establishment since they were constantly moving.
As soon as the timber in one area was exhausted, the sawmill operations
would be moved to a second area. Their operations were seasonal, and
the equipment sometimes returned to the United States. The same situa-
tion applied to road building and other construction projects.19 7 The legis-
lative history of the Canadian Tax Convention should not be considered
binding, particularly since the Treasury itself rejected it in the mid-
1960's in a dispute with Japan.' Nor is the placement of the provision
determinative of the argument. Under the new convention, a construction
site only constitutes a permanent establishment as a fixed place of
business if it exists for more than twelve months,' which was not
determinative of whether, under the old convention, a construction site
of any length was a permanent establishment.
A better way to view the problem would be to first look at the purpose
of finding a permanent establishment, which is to determine whether a
concern has made sufficient economic penetration of a country to justify
taxation there of its business profits derived from that country. In the
case of a sales agency operating through a fixed place of business, this
requires a continuity of activity, which will generally involve different
patrons. Likewise, for an agency, a dependent agent must have authority
to negotiate and conclude contracts, implying contact with more than
one customer. A construction site differs from these activities in that it
is directed toward satisfying the order of one customer-a one-shot deal.
There is no dealing with the public in the country. On the other hand,
192. For further development of this argument, see Foreign Tax II IX/12K(2).
193. Canadian Convention Protocol, art. 3 (f).
194. S. Exec. Doc. R, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1950).
195. Foreign Tax ff IX/12F(S).
196. Rev. Rul. 249, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 264; Rev. Rul. 165, 1956-2 Cum. Bull.
197. S. Exec. Doc. R, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1950).
198. S. Exec. Rep. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1964).
199. 1967 Convention, art. 4(2) (h).
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by accepting the given premise, it can be argued that most construction
sites are so extensive that the establishment of even one site should be
sufficient economic penetration to find a permanent establishment. The
conflict between these two arguments can only be resolved by determin-
ing whether it is the dealing with the public, or the size of the venture, or
a combination of the two, that is controlling. The provisions relating to
agencies and exclusions from permanent establishment seem to opt for a
dealing with the public rationale.200
The difficulties with construction sites can be traced to two conceptual
variations. First, a construction site, no matter how small or short of
duration, is always fixed in the sense of having a permanent position.
It thereby differs sharply from the agency situation. The place of the
activities cannot be changed to provide the most advantageous tax con-
sequences. Second, construction is intimately tied to real property, which
has always been considered taxable primarily in the source country. This
second variation has led to many countries arguing that substantial
construction projects should not escape tax at the source.
The twelve month limitation will take care of the annoying case of the
employee in the foreign country who supervises the installation of ma-
chinery sold by the enterprise.2 0 1 This type of installation site would
seldom last more than twelve months. However, if it does, it will run
afoul of the provision, and constitute a permanent establishment. This
may be considered unjust on the ground that the principal income pro-
ducer is the sale, which was performed without a permanent establish-
ment. If the installation lasts for more than twelve months, the installa-
tion must have produced a significant part of the income. Furthermore,
the convenience of having a fixed rule of twelve months outweighs any
injustice imposed in individual cases. The advantage of a fixed rule vil
probably lead to the inclusion of a similar clause in all future tax con-
ventions negotiated by the United States.
The new convention, like all tax conventions, slants its definition of
permanent establishment primarily toward the sales organization. The
"'substantial equipment" provision is the one concession that other types
of organizations may have substantial economic penetration in a country
without being served by a fixed place of business. For example, a French
actor might incorporate in France, and become the employee of that
corporation. The corporation would then sign a contract with a producer
for the employee's services in a play or film. Under the present pro-
visions, the corporation would have no fixed place of business in the
United States, nor would there be other grounds upon which to attach a




permanent establishment status to it. The corporation would not be taxed
on the income from the play, and the actor would be taxed only if he was
present in the United States for at least 183 days during the taxable
year,20 2 and then only on the compensation he personally received. Judi-
cious selection of the date to open the play or of a fiscal year for the
actor could result in his presence in the United States for almost a full
year without being subject to tax on the remuneration he receives from
his corporation. Similar problems exist with respect to the construction,
technical, and consulting businesses. 03 In these fields, it is likely that
great economic penetration will be accompanied by a fixed place of
business. However, this is not the case in the real estate business, where
great penetration can be achieved through the use of an independent
agent.20 4 As real estate profits are fully taxable in the source country,
abandonment of the force of attraction doctrine reduces the importance
of the decision.
D. Abandonment of the Force of Attraction Doctrine
Until 1965, all United States tax conventions made the existence of a
permanent establishment in the source country an important difference. 00
A person who had a permanent establishment was taxed by the source
country on all investment and business income from the source country.
On the other hand, a person without a permanent establishment was not
taxed in the source country on business profits, and was entitled to a
reduced rate, or an exemption from tax on investment income.20° There-
fore, the determination of the existence of a permanent establishment
became crucial. Slight fact differences could result in great differences in
202. 1967 Convention, art. 15(2). It is doubtful that the French rules relating to S.A.'s
(French corporations) and S.A.RL.'s (French limited liability companies) would hinder this.
France § 1/3.6.
203. A full discussion of the problems of reaching a just definition of permanent estab-
lishment where service organizations are concerned is beyond the scope of this article. The
material discussed in text gives a sufficient hint of the problem and its pressing necessity in
the entertainment field.
204. Cf. Inez De Amodio, 34 T.C. 894 (1960), aff'd, 299 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962);
Foreign Tax ff IX/12F(4).
205. For a further discussion of the doctrine, see Foreign Tax ff IX/13B.
206. There are two exceptions. Where a construction site constitutes a permanent establish-
ment under the Japanese Convention, only related income is taxed in the source country.
Convention with Japan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, April 16, 1954, art. VI(1)(b), [1955] 1 U.S.T.
149, T.I.A.S. No. 3176, 1 CCH Tax Treaties ff 4402 (1965). Under the United Kingdom
Convention, royalties are taxed to one with a permanent establishment in the source country




tax consequences. The reason for the rule was to provide an easy method
of determining the amount of profits and to avoid artificial allocations.2°
The United States has finally been persuaded to abandon this "force
of attraction" principle. The new convention provides that business
profits will be taxed in the source country if they are allocable to a
permanent establishment located therein.2 11 Investment income is taxable
in the source country at the full rate only if it is effectively connected
with a permanent establishment in that country.20 This rule comports
with the traditional European point of view. Once jurisdiction to tax
is established, the source country can tax the permanent establishment
on the income attributable to it.2 10 This comports with the way business
is in fact transacted, and does not raise artificial fiscal barriers for busi-
ness enterprises. 211 These alternative methods of taxation are incom-
patible and, when the United States changed its Internal Revenue Code 12
to encourage foreign investment, it made sense to shift the convention
rule to conform to the European view.
This change in convention provisions requires defining the investment
income that is effectively connected with a permanent establishment.
The same problem has been imported into United States domestic law
by the Foreign Investors Act,213 and into our tax convention law by the
recent German Convention Protocol. -1 4 The Internal Revenue Code pro-
vides that in determining whether income is effectively connected with
a permanent establishment, one must consider whether the income is
derived from assets used in the business21 or whether the activities of
the business were a material factor in the realization of the income.210
Extensive regulations have been proposed defining these terms,217 and
they will be persuasive but not determinative, in interpreting these
terms. Whether such gain was accounted for through the business is a
measure that can be used in determining whether these two conditions
apply, although failure to so account doesn't negate the presence of
207. OECD Draft Commentary 80-82.
208. The old convention read the same way, 1945 Convention, art. 3, but regulations found
all income allocable to the permanent establishment. Eg., Treas. Reg. § 514.105(c) (1957).
209. 1967 Convention, arts. 6(1), 9(3), 10(4), 11(5), 12(2) & (3).
210. See, e.g., France § 11/3.5.
211. OECD Draft Commentary 80-82.
212. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 861-64, 871-74 & 881-82.
213. See note 5 supra.
214. Protocol Modifying the Convention of July 22, 1954 with Germany for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 17, 1965, E196S] 2 US.T. 1875,
T.IA.S. No. 5920 (effective Dec. 27, 1965), 1 CCH Tax Treaties I] 3025 (1966).
215. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 864(c) (2) (A).
216. Id. § 864(c)(2)(B).
217. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c), 34 Fed. Reg. 1032 (1969).
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those factors.218 The legislative history of the Foreign Investors Act
adds some examples. The following will be considered income effectively
connected with a permanent establishment: (1) royalties income of a
licensing business operated through a permanent establishment; (2)
interest income of a financing, banking, or similar business; (3) man-
agement of corporate investments where the maintenance of such in-
vestment constitutes the principle activity of the corporation; (4)
interest on trade accounts receivable; (5) dividends or capital gains on
stock of a supplier corporation purchased to assure a ready source of
supply; (6) income earned from dividends where an individual pur-
chases stock in a domestic corporation to assure the opportunity of
performing personal services in the United States for that corporation;
and (7) interest, dividends or gains from the investment of funds on a
short term basis which are normally needed as working capital.210
The German Convention sources have little to add to this definition
in substance, but express it in a different form. Investment income is
effectively connected if the asset giving rise to the income is held by the
permanent establishment, the asset is held specifically to promote the
business activities of the permanent establishment, or the activities of
the permanent establishment are a material factor in producing the
income.220 Capital gains, however, are only included under the first two
categories. 221 Although it can be argued that the provision is inclu-
sionary and not exclusionary, the failure to specify capital gains where
the activities of the permanent establishment are a material factor in pro-
ducing them is probably intended to exclude those gains from effectively
connected income.
These provisions are troublesome to lawyers in the United States.
For United States tax purposes, a permanent establishment doesn't
"hold" any asset, since all the enterprise's property belongs to the total
enterprise. But in Germany, separate books of account must be kept
for each branch's transactions and a balance sheet drawn for the
branch.222 This is usually the practice in France also.2 Any assets
appearing on the balance sheet are held by the branch. Presumably, the
218. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 864(c) (2). In Europe, this is the traditional starting point,
and any deviations from the enterprise's books must be supported by the tax authorities with
convincing reasons. France § 11/3.6b.
219. H.R. Rep. No. 1450, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 57-68 (1966).
220. German Hearings 25.
221. Id.
222. Tillinghast 424.
223. France § 11/3.6b.
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German Convention will require United States branches of foreign en-
terprises to keep separate books .
2 4
The most easily identifiable item of effectively connected income is
income held specifically to promote the business activities of the per-
manent establishment. Into this category falls income from employment
of working capital, interest on trade receivables,2 5 and income from
assets purchased to assure a source of supply or purchase of goods or
materials of or by the permanent establishment.
A category similar to income from working capital is income derived
from insurance company assets deposited as capital or reserves against
liability on policies written in the country of the permanent establish-
ment.2 6 Without the deposit, the permanent establishment could not
write insurance within the jurisdiction, so the deposits are certainly
held to promote the business activities of the branch.
A somewhat troublesome area is loans by banks with branches in
many countries. Clearly, under the German Convention or United
States domestic law, loans made out of funds of the branch bank in the
United States are always effectively connected with the permanent estab-
lishment, since they constitute income from assets of the branch.
More difficult questions are raised when the loan is made by the main
office abroad to an habitual customer of the United States branch.
Where the loan is arranged by the branch, interest is effectively con-
nected because the activities of the branch were a material factor in
earning the income. They would not be effectively connected on the
second ground, however. 2 8 Although assets loaned on the direction of
the branch are assets held for use by the branch, they are hardly held
specifically for such use. Where the loan is made without the assistance
of the branch office, whether the income is effectively connected depends
entirely on whether the activities of the permanent establishment were a
material factor in producing the income. This is dependent on the facts
and circumstances of the case. If the loan is one of a series of loans
normally secured through the branch, it probably is effectively con-
224. There is dear authority for such a change in regulations. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 6001, permits the Secretary of the Treasury, whenever in his judgment it is necessary, to
require any person to "keep such records, as the Secretary . . . deems sufficient to show
whether or not such person is liable for tax...."
225. German Hearings 32.
226. To do business in most states of the United States, foreign insurers must deposit assets
sufficient to assure payment of claims with a state official. See, eg., Cal. Ins. Code §§ 1590-99
(West 1966).




nected. If the customer is in the country of the home office and ex-
periences a sudden need for funds the income is probably not effectively
connected, although it can be argued that the good relations with the
branch were a material factor in producing the loan from the home
office, rather than from a competitor, and the income should be effec-
tively connected within the material factor test.
Earnings repatriated from the permanent establishment to the home
office and there invested are not effectively connected without some
greater showing.22 This amounts to no more than a repatriation of
earnings. The basic question is the functional relation of the earnings
to the branch's activities, and not the source of the funds.
The area of royalties may provide some trouble, although it is more
likely to do so in the German than the 1967 Convention. Assume that
a foreign enterprise develops a patented product which it manufactures
in its home state and sells through a permanent establishment in the
United States. The company also decides to grant a United States
citizen a nonexclusive license to manufacture the product in the United
States. The patent rights are not held specifically for the benefit of the
United States branch, because of the foreign manufacture. It has been
argued that an allocation of value might be made to the United States
patent rights, and that part of the rights should be considered an asset
specifically for the benefit of the United States branch. There is an
argument for taxation under the German Convention 8 1 on analogy to
the provision including in business profits of the permanent establish-
ment not only effectively connected earnings, but also income derived
from the sale of goods of the same kind as those sold by the permanent
establishment.' 3 This argument disappears with the absence of such a
provision in the 1967 Convention.
The third major division of included items under the German Con-
vention is where the activities of the permanent establishment are a
material factor in producing the income. While difficult to define pre-
cisely, the contours of this inclusion should be relatively clear. It would
include, for example, a situation where the branch made the sale subject
to acceptance at the home office, and the only work done by the home
229. Id.
230. Id. at 425-26.
231. Convention with the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, July 22, 1954, art. III(1), [1954) 3 U.S.T. 2768,
T.I.A.S. No. 3133 (effective Dec. 20, 1954), 1 CCH Tax Treaties II 3006 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as German Convention], as modified, Protocol Modifying the Convention of July 22,
1954 with Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income,
Sept. 17, 1965, [1965] 2 U.S.T. 1875, T.I.A.S. No. 5920 (effective Dec. 27, 1965).
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office is accepting the sale. It would probably not include the direct sale
of goods also sold by the branch. A different result would obtain if it
could be established that the promotional activities of the branch in the
United States were a major factor in inducing the sale, by testimony of
the customer or through demonstrating the pervasiveness of the ad-
vertising.
The 1967 Convention contains no such gloss on the phrase "effectively
connected with a permanent establishment," and it might be argued
from this omission that none of these tests should be used. A more
likely explanation is that with the domestic terms better defined in the
Protocol to the German Convention and United States law, it was
thought unnecessary to incorporate an explanation in the 1967 Convention.
Application of the fringes of these new concepts must await case-by-
case development over the next several years. This provision will be a
permanent feature in future tax conventions of the United States.
E. Branch Profits
United States citizens have never been happy with foreign branch
profits taxes. They have thought that one of the advantages of oper-
ating through a branch is that dividends paid by the parent are not
subject to taxation in the foreign country. Were this true, branch
operations would have considerable foreign tax advantages over sub-
sidiary operations. Subsidiaries pay foreign income tax on their income
from abroad, and they withhold a dividend tax when the earnings are
paid out to the domestic parent.
This discrimination was perceived very early. Since 1857, France has
attempted to equalize the tax burdens of operating through a branch and
a subsidiary.232 The United States has similarly done so since 1921. -3
The method adopted by both countries is strikingly similar, although
the measure of the tax is somewhat different. France imposes a tax on
distributions to shareholders of corporations doing business in France
when they receive dividends. The tax is levied on the portion of the
dividend deemed derived from French earnings. 4 The portion taxed
was not, however, measured by French earnings, but by a formula
based either on the ratio of French assets to total assets, or French sales
to total sales, expressed to the nearest tenth.' In 1965, as part of a
232. France § 11/3.7, at 764 n.185.
233. Rev. Act of 1921, § 217(a) (2) (B), 42 Stat 227, 243.
234. France § 11/3.7a.
235. Id. § 11/3.7c. The use of the French assets to the total assets ratio was apparently
one of the precursors of the first French-United States tax convention, namely, the 1932
Convention. The history is related in Carroll 228-29; McCaffery 398-401.
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general reform in the treatment of dividends, the quota system was
abolished.23 6 At present, the tax is imposed on the corporation's earn-
ings from France, after deducting the 50 percent corporation tax. The
corporation makes a prepayment of 25 percent of the dividend deemed
derived from French earnings to the government on behalf of the share-
holder. 87
The United States imposes a tax on a shareholder measured by his
gross income from United States sources. Dividends from corporations
whose income for the preceding three year period is at least 50 percent
effectively connected with a trade or business carried on in the United
States is from sources within the United States in the ratio that the
corporation's income from United States sources during the period bears
to the corporation's total income.238 The payor of such dividends must
withhold tax at the rate of 30 percent.23 9
Under the old convention, several changes were required in the French
system of taxing branch profits. First, the tax was required to be com-
puted on the basis of the percentage of profits actually derived from
sources within France, rather than on the artificial basis for allocation
provided by French domestic law.240 This provision is omitted from the
new convention as French law now incorporates this change. 41 Second,
taxation of branch profits was limited to a situation where the United
States enterprise derived profits through a permanent establishment in
236. International Tax Law 705.
237. Norr 329. The discrimination this system of divided taxation imposes Is discussed In
the text accompanying notes 270-84 infra.
238. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 861(a) (2) (B).
239. Id. §§ 1441(a)-(b) & 1442(a). This also involves discrimination, but only in the
method of payment. There is no withholding on dividends paid to persons who are not
nonresident aliens or foreign corporations. Where no withholding is required, the recipient
has the use of the full payment until the tax is normally due. A second discrimination is found
in the fixed rate of United States tax of 30 percent on nonresident aliens and foreign corpora-
tions for dividends not effectively connected with a trade or business carried on in the
United States. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a). The tax rate of others will
vary with the size of the income from 14 percent to 70 percent. Before the Foreign Investors
Act, the 30 percent was a minimum; where the size of the income indicated a higher bracket,
the higher rate was charged.
240. 1945 Convention, art. 15; Carroll, Third Tax Convention with France, 25 Taxes
208, 210 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Third Tax Convention]. This provision has been incor-
porated in all income tax conventions negotiated between the United States and France. See
Carroll 229; McCaffery 398.
241. Of course, there is now no convention inhibition on a return to the old system of
artificial allocation.
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France.2  This provision is continued in the new convention. 3 Third,
the tax was assessed on three quarters of the profits derived.24 The
French have interpreted this to mean profits after the 50 percent cor-
porate tax. This has been changed in the new convention to two-thirds
of the normal base for taxation245 and the rate of tax is reduced from
the present 25 percent to 15 percent.240 This represents a compromise
between the amount of tax that would be paid by a United States citizen
on portfolio income (15 percent of the full amount) and the amount that
would be paid by a parent receiving dividends from a subsidiary (5
percent of the full amount). With the reduction of the base by one-third,
and a maximum tax rate of 15 percent, the effective tax rate will be 10
percent. 47 Fourth, under the old convention, the tax was imposed when
the profits were earned, rather than awaiting the declaration of a divi-
dend. The new convention conforms to the French practice of imposing
the tax only when the home office declares a dividend.
Under the 1945 Convention, a United States corporation was put in
a less favorable tax position in two circumstances-when the ratio of
French earnings to total earnings exceeded the ratio of French assets
to total assets, and when the United States corporation didn't distribute
at least 75 percent of its earnings in the taxable year in which they were
earned. The first position no longer exists, with the abolition of the assets
quota, and the second is abolished by the new convention.24 8
France has always been quite attached to its branch profits tax. Al-
242. 1945 Convention, art. 15. Although the provision reads "American corporations
which maintain in France permanent establishments shall be liable [for branch profits tax]
on three-fourths of the profits actually derived," it has been interpreted to preclude the
assessment of any tax in the absence of a permanent establishment. The new convention
will be interpreted in the same way. S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (196S). This
is not the only interpretation possible. See 1945 Convention Protocol, art. MI; France § 11/3.7.
Contra, OECD Draft Commentary 107.
243. 1967 Convention, art. 13(2) (a).
244. 1945 Convention, art. 15. This is supposedly justified as representing the amount of
profits a corporation could ordinarily distribute as dividends after setting aside legal reserves,
paying taxes, and amortizing its debt. Carroll 229. Obviously, French corporate taxes were
much lower at that time. With the present 50 percent rate, the same rationale would demand
a figure of one-third. The 1967 Convention's reduction to two-thirds is scarcely suffcient.
245. 1967 Convention, art. 13(2) (a) (i).
246. Id., art. 13(2)(a)(ii).
247. S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1968).
248. It can be argued that the corporation is only at a disadvantage if it never distributes
75 percent of its earnings. However, there is always an advantage to the taxpayer which is
lost under the new convention provision. This is the reverse side of a macrocriteria Professor
Joseph Sneed refers to as "Adequacy, Treasury style." Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income
Tax Policy, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 567, 572 (1965).
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though the OECD Draft abolishes such taxes, France noted a reserva-
tion to that provision .2 4  France has, in other tax conventions, reduced
its branch profits tax. Under the Franco-German tax convention,25 ( a
German corporation is subject to the normal French branch profits tax.
However, the amount of distributed profits subject to the tax cannot
exceed the lower of one quarter of the sum normally taxable under
French domestic law or the income actually realized by the French
establishment of the German corporation. Although the 1967 Convention
has narrowed the gap somewhat between treatment of German and
United States corporations, German corporations pay an effective rate,
under the new rules, of only 64 percent, while United States corpora-
tions pay 10 percent.
There is yet another respect in which the United States does not enjoy
most favored nation treatment with respect to the branch profits tax.
Under the German Convention, where a German corporation can show
that more than 75 percent of its shares are held by nationals of the
country of incorporation, the portion of profits taxed in France is re-
duced proportionately.251 There is no such provision for the United
States as it would eliminate the tax entirely in many instances.
France has been trying to eliminate the type of provision found in the
Franco-German Convention as it has successfully eliminated the pro-
vision from its convention with Switzerland, with the result that it now
comports with the 1967 Convention.25
2
One other type of tax on branch profits is regulated by the 1967 Con-
vention. France has traditionally imposed registration taxes for all
kinds of capital transactions. 3  Particularly vexing was the tax levied
on the internal transfer of profits to capital on the books of the enter-
249. OECD Draft, art. 10(5); OECD Draft Commentary 107.
250. See Convention between the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Establishment of Principles for Reciprocal
Administrative and Legal Assistance with Respect to Taxes on Income and Fortune, Business
Taxes and Land Taxes, July 21, 1959, art. 8(1), 9 U.N. Int'l Tax Agreements A(1) No. 68,
at 4.
251. France § 11/4.6d, at 819.
252. Compare Agreement, Final Protocol and Annexes between the French Republic and
the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Establishment of
Rules of Reciprocal Administrative Assistance with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Property, Dec. 31, 1953, art. 6(1), 6 U.N. Int'l Tax Agreements 59 (1956), with Supple-
mentary Convention between the French Republic and the Swiss Confederation for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital of Sept. 9,
1966, Dec. 3, 1969, art. 2, Eur. Tax Supp. Serv. § c (1970) (effective retroactively Jan. 2,
1970).
253. See generally France §§ 3/4.3-.4.
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prise in order to issue a stock dividend or bonus shares.21 The rate was
12 percent of the amount of the transfer. The new convention provides
that this tax shall not be levied on profits realized by a French perma-
nent establishment of a United States corporation.2 : However, the
importance of this provision has greatly diminished in recent years.
Basically, only banks, insurance companies, and specialized service com-
panies operate through French branches. Nearly all United States man-
ufacturers utilize French subsidiaries for their operations.
Under the 1967 Convention, for the first time, limitations are imposed
on United States taxation of branch profits to benefit French residents.
The new convention raises from 50 to 80 percent the gross income
percentage that must be attributable to a permanent establishment in
the United States before the dividend may be taxed as from United
States sources. 2
56
There is also some restriction in the new convention on the imposition
of the personal holding company tax and the accumulated earnings tax.
French corporations will be exempt from the personal holding company
tax if all its stock is owned by French individuals for the entire taxable
year. 57 French corporations shall be exempt from the accumulated
earnings tax unless they are engaged in trade or business in the United
States through a permanent establishment.L25 This is the one remnant of
the force of attraction principle in the new convention. It is difficult to
understand the conditions imposed for exemption from the accumulated
earnings tax. If its purpose is to discourage the maintenance of funds
in the corporation which would be taxed to the shareholders at a higher
rate, the presence or absence of a permanent establishment in the United
States would seem to be irrelevant. The significant question would be
whether the shareholders were United States residents or citizens. If all
of the shareholders were French residents, the purpose of the accumu-
lated earnings tax would not be defeated by a failure to levy it because
United States individual income tax would not be avoided.'"
The United States prefers a clause outlawing all branch profits taxes,
and will urge its incorporation into all future tax conventions. Where
this is not possible, it will settle for a limiting clause like that appearing.
in the 1967 Convention 2 60
254. Id. § 3/4Ac.
255. 1967 Convention, art. 13(2)(b).
256. Id., art. 13(1)(a).
257. Id., art. 13(1)(b) (i).
258. Id., art. 13(1)(b) (ii).
259. See text accompanying notes 322-34 infra.
260. See, e.g, German Convention, art. XIV; United Kingdom Convention, art. XV.
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F. Allocation of Income Between Related Persons
United States tax law contains provisions permitting the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue to reallocate income, deductions, and credits
between related parties to properly reflect the income earned by those
persons. 26' Extensive regulations have been published for the guidance
of taxpayers.262
The 1967 Convention continues the 1945 Convention's authorization
for this reallocation between residents of the two countries who are
related, but broadens the provision by expanding the definition of re-
lated persons to approximate section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Under the old convention, the provision was applicable only where one
enterprise participated in the management or capital of an enterprise of
the other country.2 3 This covers controlled corporations and parent-sub-
sidiary operations, but does not include brother-sister corporations or
other enterprises under common control which deal with each other.
The new convention provides that a person other than a corporation is
related to a corporation if such person participates directly or indirectly
in the management, control, or capital of the corporation.0 4 A corpora-
tion is related to another corporation if there is a parent-subsidiary
relation or if some person participates directly or indirectly in the
management, control or capital of both corporations. 20 This leaves un-
resolved the question of when unincorporated organizations are related
to each other. The problem should not arise, however, as partnerships
and trusts are generally disregarded under the domestic law of both
contracting states and for tax convention purposes. Such provisions are
likely to recur in future United States tax conventions.
IV. INVESTMENT INCOME
The principal purpose of the provisions of the 1967 Convention re-
lating to investment income is to encourage the free flow of capital
between the two countries." 6 This is commonly done by reducing taxa-
tion on such income in the source country. The most significant change
in the taxation of investment income between the old and new conven-
tions is the abandonment of the force of attraction doctrine discussed
above.267 This makes the flow of investment easier by eliminating an
impediment to investment capital by residents with a permanent estab-
261. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 482.
262. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1A82-1 (1968).
263. 1945 Convention, art. 5.
264. 1967 Convention, art. 8(2) (a).
265. Id., art. 8(2)(b).
266. Chamber Talk 7.
267. See text accompanying notes 205-31 supra.
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lishment in the other state. The other radical departure from standard
tax conventions provides for the taxation of industrial royalties at
source, with a tax rate not exceeding 5 percent.28 At first glance, this
would appear to impede investment. Whether or not actuality conforms
to appearance is discussed below,269 after specific provisions of the in-
vestment articles of the 1967 Convention are detailed.
A. Dividends
The 1967 Convention substantially liberalizes the taxation of divi-
dends in the source country. Such a liberalization was greatly needed,
in view of the changes in the French taxation of dividends enacted in
1965. These changes had two results. First, foreign shareholders of
French corporations were to be less favorably treated than French
shareholders, and second, French citizens were to be given a tax in-
centive to make the purchase of shares of French corporations more
attractive to them than the purchase of shares of foreign corporations. --'
To properly understand the shift brought about by the new conven-
tion, it is necessary to sketch French taxation of dividends, both before
and after 1965. French corporations have been subject to tax on cor-
porate earnings at the rate of 50 percent. 2 7 1 However, before 1965, a
withholding tax of 24 percent was levied on dividends paid by French
corporations.2 72 The same withholding tax was imposed on dividends
paid to French residents through French withholding agents by foreign
corporations273 The tax withheld was credited on the French resident's
tax return by a complex process. -2 74 The tax withheld from nonresidents
constituted a "definitive discharge" of their tax liability. -70 This tax
system resulted in general neutrality. French investors paid the same tax
whether they invested in domestic or foreign corporations. Nonresident
shareholders paid the same tax as resident shareholders (provided
their tax bracket exceeded 24 percent). -76 It also resulted in a tax in-
centive to retain earnings. Out of every $200 of corporate earnings,
268. See text accompanying notes 325-37 infra.
269. See text accompanying notes 351-54 infra.
270. Norr 331.
271. France § 5/2.1. This is true both before and after 1965.
272. Id. § 9/2.12a, at 510.
273. Id. § 11/2.8f.
274. Id. §§ 9/2.12b & 11/2.8f.
275. Id. § 11/3.3, at 752-53.
276. The same discrimination against low income taxpayers is found in the United States,
where the minimum rate is 30 percent. In fact, except for rate differences, and the fact that
there is no withholding applicable to residents, the description of the French system prior
to 1965 is applicable to the United States. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1441-42, 871(a)(1)
& 881(a); Chonmie §§ 215 & 248.
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one-half was taken for the corporate income tax. If the remaining $100
were invested by the corporation, the entire amount would earn further
income. However, if the remaining $100 were distributed as a dividend,
the shareholder would windup with only $76 to reinvest.
Under the new French dividend system, the same 50 percent cor-
porate tax applies, but there is no withholding on payments to French
residents. In computing his gross income, the shareholder includes 150
percent of the dividend he receives, and takes a credit against his tax
for half the dividend he receives. The provision for "grossing up" the
dividend to 150 percent is a result from a credit being given for one-half
the dividend. Theoretically, by paying the corporate tax, the corporation
has discharged the shareholder's tax liability through the medium of
the credit. Therefore, the taxpayer has income in that amount. This is
because France views its tax as a unitary tax, which is paid by the cor-
poration for the shareholder when the corporation pays the tax on its
own earnings. Thus it is called an integrated tax system. A taxpayer in
a 30 percent marginal tax bracket is left considerably richer under the
new system; the $200 in earnings results in a dividend of $100. His
initial liability is $45 (30 percent of $150), and he has a credit of $50,
$5 of which he can use against his other tax liability. In other words, net
savable income rose from $70 before the reform to $105 after the
reform.277
The system is more complex when applied to dividends paid to French
277. The foregoing description is a synopsis of Norr. His excellent work is indispensable
to an understanding of the new convention, as is attested to by its frequent citation in this
article. Norr suggests the following comparison between corporate and shareholder taxation
before and after the 1965 reforms:
TAXATiON OF CORPORATIONS AND SnAREHOLDERS (L FRANCS)
Description Before 1965 After 1965
Reform Reform
Corporation Earnings Before Tax 200F 200F
Corporation Income Tax (50 percent) 100 100
Balance Available for Distribution 100 100
Gross Dividend 100 100
Withheld at Source 24 zero
Shareholder's Net Dividend Receipt 76 100
Shareholder's Tax Credit 24 50
Shareholder's Taxable Income 100 150
Shareholder's Tax 30 45
Shareholder's Credit 24 50
Additional Tax Due 6 (5)
Dividend Actually Received 76 100
Tax Benefit (6) 5




citizens by foreign corporations. Before the reform, these recipients
were taxed exactly like their brethren who received dividends from
French corporations. Since the reform, the withholding rate has been
raised to 33Y3 percent of the dividend, and the taxpayer is required to
include the dividend before calculating withholding in his gross in-
come. 2 7 The withholding is then applied to his taxable income. Using
the above example of a net dividend of $100, the taxpayer would receive
$67, while $33 would be withheld. $100 would be included in his gross
income, on which his tax, in the 30 percent bracket, would be $30. The
credit of $33 would leave him $3 extra to apply to other income. There-
fore, the net economic gain would be $70. This, in effect, leaves the
French shareholder in a foreign corporation without the tax benefits of
the reform, and therefore encourages him to purchase shares of French
corporations, since their net dividends result in a greater after-tax eco-
nomic gain to him.
A similar discrimination is inherent in the current treatment of divi-
dends paid by French corporations to nonresidents. The old system of
withholding on the dividend still applies here, but the rate has been
raised to 25 percent. The total enrichment (before foreign taxes) would
be $75 for $200 of corporate earnings, or $30 less than a French citizen
would realize while the foreign tax remains unpaid.
In summary, these changes result in encouraging French residents to
invest in French, rather than foreign corporations; they also result in
more favorable tax treatment for French investors than is accorded
foreign investors in French corporations. It would be an understatement
to say that the United States was unhappy with these results. The
Treasury Department contended that, even if such differential tax treat-
ment was temporarily necessary for reasons of balance of payments, it
should not have been incorporated as a structural component of the tax
system, as was done by France.-7 However, negotiations leading to the
1967 Convention produced little relief.
The new convention maintains the maximum limit on taxation of
dividends in the source country at 15 percent.280 While this does not
equalize the treatment accorded United States and French recipients of
French dividends, it does ameliorate the discrimination, but only as to
United States low income shareholders. The United States shareholder
now has a total enrichment, before United States taxes, of $85-$10
278. This provision was repealed in 1967. See 1 French Income Serv. 124-26 (rev. ed.
1969). The text, however, adequately states the background of the treaty negotiations.
279. Address by Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Tax Institute of
America Symposium, Dec. 2, 1965, Treas. Dep't Release No. F-291, at 2 (Dec. 2, 1965).
280. 1967 Convention, art. 9(2) (a).
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more than he would have had without the new convention, on $200 of
corporate earnings, but still $20 less than would accrue to a French
resident.28' Unless he is in the lowest marginal rate, the United States
shareholder will have to find some additional cash to pay the excess
United States income tax over the 15 percent French withholding that
is creditable. More important, in terms of practical effect, this solution
does nothing to eliminate the tax disadvantages facing French residents
who invest in United States, rather than in French corporations. How-
ever, the tax provision does accomplish its objective which is a short-
term improvement in the balance of payments situation of France.282
It is possible to devise a system that would eliminate the discrimina-
tion against foreign investors in French corporations and against French
investors in foreign corporations. This system would give the shareholder
in both corporations a credit for the allocable amount of the taxes paid
to the other country by the corporation of which he was a shareholder.
Of course, the shareholder would have to add the amount of this tax to
his dividend in figuring his gross income. The United States currently
has such a system governing the receipt of dividends by corporations.288
Similarly, France has a similar system with respect to French share-
holders of French corporations.2 84 The fact that the corporation paid
the tax to a foreign country is no reason to refuse to extend the system
to dividends received by individual shareholders.
281. The computation worked out as follows:
Earnings of French Corporations $200
Corporation Income Tax (50 percent) 100
Retained Earnings & distributed dividend 100
French withholding 25
Net dividend paid 75
The fact that the $15 French tax is creditable against the recipient's United States Income
tax both under the Internal Revenue Code and the 1967 Convention does not increase the
recipient's economic gain because, in the absence of special circumstances, creditability of
foreign taxes is limited to the United States tax assessed on the foreign income. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 904; E. Owens, The Foreign Tax Credit 291-314 (1961).
282. See Norr 321-22 for the legislative history. The United States is hardly qualified to
throw the first stone. Its sin in this area is embodied in the Interest Equalization Tax, Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 4911-31, which imposes a surcharge up to 15 percent of the purchase
price on the purchase of stock in foreign corporations. This tax does meet Secretary Surrey's
criterion by being extrinsic to the normal tax system. The tax is also temporary, Id. § 4911(d),
but is, of course, subject to extension, and has been extended five times, with the likelihood
that it will be extended again. Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-128, 83 Stat. 201; Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 91-65, 83 Stat.
105; Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 91-50, 83 Stat. 86; Interest
Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-59, 81 Stat. 145; Interest Equaliza-
tion Tax Extension Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-243, 79 Stat. 954.
283. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 902.
284. See text accompanying note 277 supra.
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The contracting states have chosen a different method to partially
alleviate these difficulties. Apparently, France will make a cash payment
to the portfolio of a United States shareholder of a French corporation
equal to 50 percent of the dividend distributed less the applicable with-
holding." 5 While this equalizes the treatment of French and United
States shareholders of French corporations, it does nothing for the
French shareholder of a United States corporation:
The big bonus for United States enterprise in the new convention is
the treatment of dividends from subsidiaries. Under the old convention,
these dividends received no special treatment as the standard 15 percent
rate applied." 6 Under the new convention, the tax on dividends received
from a corporation in which the recipient holds at least 10 percent of
the voting shares during its entire taxable year is limited to 5 percent
at source.28 7 This provision is more liberal than the one contained in the
old convention and goes farther than the OECD Draft, which requires
25 percent ownership by the recipient corporation."e It does not, how-
ever, meet the stated goal of some United States tax conventions, namely,
a reduction of the rate of total foreign tax to a level where it is entirely
absorbed by the foreign tax credit. - 9 This provision is a common feature
of United States tax conventions and is greatly desired by the Treasury.
The intercorporate dividends provision has a second qualification
which is designed to exclude dividends paid by holding or investment
companies. The 5 percent rate only applies if, during the taxable year
prior to the declaration of the dividends, the payor corporation received
no more than 25 percent of its gross income from interest and dividends
(other than certain kinds of active interest or dividends).20 The ex-
ception for active interest and dividends is comprised of interest derived
from the conduct of a banking, insurance, or financing business, and
dividends or interest received from subsidiary corporations 50 percent
or more of whose voting stock is owned by the corporation receiving
the dividend. 91 The terms "dividends" and "interest" appear in the Inter-
285. Treas. Dep't Release No. K-270 (Nov. 13, 1969).
286. 1945 Convention, art. 6A. This delay in recognizing the special nature of intercor-
porate dividends is perhaps due to the fact that United States corporations first began using
French subsidiaries in an effort to avoid the French branch *profits tax. Carroll 228. The
French response was to pierce the corporate entity, id., which led to the specific exclusion of
subsidiary corporations from the concept of permanent establishment. Id. at 230.
287. 1967 Convention, art. 9(2) (b) (i).
288. OECD Draft, art. 10(2)(a).
289. Foreign Tax ff IX/SA. Under normal conditions, this would be impossible, since the
French corporate tax of 50 percent exceeds that of the United States, which is 48 percent.
It is accomplished during the period of the Vietnam surtax.
290. 1967 Conventions, art. 9(2) (b) (ii).
291. It apjears at first reading that the words "paying corporation" should be changed to
1,971]
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nal Revenue Code292 and have been defined by regulations.93 These regu-
lations require that the corporation be primarily engaged in "(a) [r] eceiv-
ing deposits . . . from the public; (b) [m]aking loans to the public;
(c) [p]urchasing ... [receivables]; or (d) [p]urchasing stock or debt
obligations from the issuer or obligor ... for ... resale to the public.29 4
In short, these terms encompass both commercial and investment bank-
ing. To qualify under the exception, the corporation must derive more
than 50 percent of its gross income from such activities. There is also a
provision that income, other than the four types noted above, may be
from a banking, financing, or similar business if its production is inci-
dental to that business, such as income derived from the investment of
working capital during non-peak periods, or dividends from securities
acquired on the default of a loan." 5 Income from a banking business
earned by corporations owned under the Edge Act 20 is also included. 97
However, there is a proviso that no more than 20 percent of the sub-
sidiary corporation's gross income constitutes foreign personal holding
company income, 98 foreign base company sales income, 00 or foreign
base company services income.11° It is doubtful whether this detailed
definition of income derived from the conduct of a banking, financing,
or similar business was brought home to France during the negotiations.
The general definition, including the special rules on incidental income,
would appear to be unexceptional. However, France might not accept
the special rules for the subsidiaries of Edge Act corporations.
The provision dealing with dividends in the new convention is sig-
nificant for another reason. Never before has France accepted source
rules for dividend income in a tax convention. The old convention con-
tained source rules for several types of income. These rules were a first
step toward a much-needed international agreement on allocation of
income principles. 01 Under the new convention, dividends paid by a
corporation of either country shall be treated as income from sources
within that country unless the corporation had a permanent establish-
ment in the other country and more than 80 percent of its gross income
read "receiving corporation," but a thorough reading of the provision indicates that It Is
indeed correctly drafted.
292. Int. Rev. Code of 1954; § 954(c) (3) (B).
293. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(d) (2) (1964).
294. Id. § 1.954-2(d) (2) (ii) (1964).
295. Id. § 1.954-2(d) (2) (iii) (1964).
296. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-31 (1964).
297. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(d) (2) (iv) (1964).
298. Id. § 1.954-2 (iv) (b) (1964).
299. Id. § 1.954-3 (1964).
300. Id. § 1.954-4 (1964).
301, See Owens 430, 438-41.
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was taxable to such permanent establishment for a three year period
ending with the close of its taxable year preceding the declaration of
the dividend 02° This source definition conforms to the limitations on
taxation of branch profits discussed earlier.0 3 Finally, where a prepay-
ment (precompte) is levied on dividends paid by a French corporation to
a United States resident, provision is made for such a resident to secure
a refund on the prepayment, subject to the appropriate withholding tax
of either 5 or 15 percent 0 4
B. Interest
The 1945 Convention limited the rate of tax on interest withheld in
the source country to 15 percen.30 The 1967 Convention reduces that
rate to 10 percent, except in the case of interest on bonds issued before
January 1, 1965, on which the tax is limited to 12 percent. °0 The cut-off
date conforms to French domestic law30 7 and, although there is no
difference in principle in using the date of January 1, 1965, it does make
it easier for withholding corporations by providing the same withholding
rate for each issue of bonds.
The new convention contains an unexceptional definition of interest
that is taken from the OECD Draft.0 8 It includes income from govern-
ment securities, debt claims of every kind, and "all other income as-
similated to income from money lent by the taxation law of the State in
which the income has its source."300 This definition would include im-
puted interest derived from sources within the United States resulting
from a failure to charge an adequate rate of interest on contracts calling
for deferred payment. 10 Most of the imputed interest found under this
provision, however, would probably be effectively connected with a per-
manent establishment, and thus not subject to the reduction in tax
provided by the interest provision. However, there will certainly be some
302. 1967 Convention, art. 9(4).
303. See text accompanying note 245 supra.
304. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 507.22-.29 passim (1966).
305. 1945 Convention, art. 6A.
306. 1967 Convention, arts. 10(2) & (3). This provision is unusual in United States tax
treaties. Usually, interest is exempt from tax at source. See, e.g., Germany Convention, art.
VII(l). A small tax conforms to the OECD Draft, art. 11(1)-(2). The exemption of interest
dates back to an early League of Nations report suggesting that where the source country
taxes interest, the lender will force the borrower to pay the tax. L.N. Doc. No. F (73/F/19)
[1923] at 8-9; International Tax Law 697.
307. France § 9/1.2b.
308. 1967 Convention, art. 10(5); OECD Draft, art. 11(3).
309. 1967 Convention, art. 10(5).
310. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 483(a).
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interest that is not effectively connected with a permanent establishment
under this provision, such as the casual sale of real estate.
The new convention also contains a source rule for interestY" Interest
paid by one of the contracting states, a political subdivision, or a resi-
dent thereof, is considered income from sources within that country.
This is also the rule under the domestic law of the United States. 1"
When the person paying the interest has a permanent establishment in
one country, in connection with which the indebtedness on which the
interest is paid was originally incurred, and the interest is borne by that
permanent establishment, that interest is deemed to be sourced in the
country of the permanent establishment.313 This provision has no ana-
logue in United States domestic law. The other minor exceptions to the
principle that interest is sourced in the country of the payor found in
the Internal Revenue Code 14 are not carried over into the new conven-
tion.
There is a provision in the new convention relating to both interest
and royalties which provides that where, due to the relationship be-
tween the payor and the recipient, the amount of interest or royalties
exceeds an arm's length payment, the reduced rate for interest and
royalties shall apply only to the arm's length amount. 316 Presumably,
the same result could have been reached under article 8 of the new
convention, relating to reallocations between related persons.3 " Its in-
clusion in these specific provisions reflects the official belief that mis-
allocations of interest and royalties occur quite often.317
Finally, interest received by one country, or by an instrumentality
thereof not subject to income tax in that country, is exempt at the
source."' l All of the above provisions relating to interest can be expected
to be carried over future tax conventions negotiated by the United
States.
C. Royalties
The new convention defines the term royalties. The definition is sub-
stantially expanded to conform largely to the OECD Draft819 by in-
cluding consideration for "the right to use, patents, designs or models,
311. 1967 Convention, art. 10(6).
312. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 861(a) (1).
313. 1967 Convention, art. 10(6).
314. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 861(a) (1).
315. 1967 Convention, arts. 10(7) & 11(7).
316. Id., art. 8(1).
317. See text accompanying notes 327-29 infra.
318. 1967 Convention, art. 10(8).
319. OECD Draft, art. 12(2).
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plans, secret processes or for formulae, trademarks, or other like prop-
erty or rights .... W20 It also includes gains from the sale or exchange
of any such right if the payment is contingent on the future produc-
tivity of the property.
21
The 1967 Convention also makes substantial changes in the treatment
of royalties. Under the old convention, certain enumerated royalties
were exempt from tax in the source country, provided that the recipient
maintained no permanent establishment there. 22 Under the new conven-
tion, royalties, like Gaul, are divided into three parts. Movie royalties
are considered to be business profits. " Copyright royalties for literary,
artistic, or scientific works, including gains realized from the sale or
exchange of property giving rise to those royalties, are still exempt from
tax in the source country. 2 4 Industrial royalties, however, are subject
to a 5 percent tax in the source country. -8 The change in treatment for
industrial royalties resulted from two feelings on the part of France.
The first was that the balance of payments on industrial royalties was
so overwhelmingly against them that the revenue loss was quite
serious.3 28 The second was that excessive amounts had been paid by
French concerns to United States concerns as royalties and, these
amounts were in fact disguised dividends. France hoped that by taxing
these royalties, a more thorough investigation would be made. Due to
the deductibility of royalties, however, it was still advantageous to
classify any distribution as a royalty, rather than as a dividend, in the
hope that the fiscal authorities would not discover the change.
The new regime for royalties is quite proper. Although it can be
argued that interest and royalties should be treated identically, since
they have the same properties as investment vehicles, a significant dif-
ference does exist. Interest infidelities are readily corrected through the
use of reallocation devices. 327 The fair market rate of interest can be
determined with at least reasonable accuracy. A fair royalty, however,
is much more difficult to assess in the light of various products and other
differences. Particularly in the field of know-how royalties, the fair
320. 1967 Convention, art. 11(4) (a).
321. Id., art. 11(4)(b).
322. 1945 Convention, art. 7; Carroll 231, 233.
323. 1967 Convention, art. 6(5) ; see text accompanying notes 109-21 supra.
324. 1967 Convention, art. 11(3).
325. Ic, art. 11(2).
326. The feeling of France that its balance of royalty payments with the United States
is very unfavorable is supported by the limited and inadequate statistics available to the
public. See Airgram A-416 from the American Embassy in Paris, France, to the Department
of State, Sept. 8, 1967, provided through the courtesy of Air. Frederick Strauss, Director,
European Division, Bureau of International Commerce, US. Dep't of Commerce.
327. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 482.
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value of the services becomes quite difficult to ascertain. This provides
a fertile field in which to transmute dividends into royalties.
Although this would at first seem to be a derogation from the OECD
Draft, which provides a complete exemption for royalties in the source
country, 8s there are special derogations to that Draft for Greece, Lux-
embourg, Portugal, and Spain, who were unwilling to relinquish source
taxation on royalties but would be willing to limit that taxation to 5
percent, and Austria and Turkey, who wanted to limit it to 10 and 20
percent, respectively. Each of these countries are less developed coun-
tries in which the flow of royalites is heavily outward. Thus, two prin-
ciples arise from the OECD Draft. First, where the flow of royalties is
about even, no tax will be levied at the source, and second, where there
is a substantial disparity in the flow of royalties, a 5 percent tax may be
levied at source. Thus, the spirit of the OECD Draft has been preserved
by this provision.
Royalties for the right to use property in one country constitute in-
come sourced in that country.32 This conforms to United States domestic
tax law,30 but France considers royalties sourced where the patent or
process was developed. 31 This provision generally conforms to the
domestic law of the United States, without the extraordinary distinctions
drawn between royalties and capital gains. 32 However, one significant
difference from the OECD Draft lies in the exclusion of payments for
the right to use industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment. These
payments constitute royalties under the OECD Draft, 3 but are con-
sidered business profits by the new convention 6n the rationale that they
are derived from the rental of tangible property. 34
D. Capital Gains
The capital gains provision of the 1945 Convention has been sub-
stantially revised by the 1967 Convention. Under the 1945 Convention,
capital gains derived in one of the states from the sale or exchange of
stocks, securities or commodities by a resident of the other state were
exempt from taxation if the resident had no permanent establishment
in the source state.3 5 There was no provision in the old convention re-
lated to the sale of other types of capital assets. The provision in the
328. OECD Draft, art. 12(1).
329. 1967 Convention, art. 11(6).
330. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 861 (a) (4).
331. France § 9/5.2b.
332. Rev. Rul. 353, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 408; Chommie § 117.
333. OECD Draft, art. 12(2).
334. 1967 Convention, art. 6(5); see text accompanying notes 122-30 supra,
335. 1945 Convention, art. 11.
[Vol. 39
U.S.-FRENCH TAX CONVENTION
new convention covers all types of capital assets3 36 except sales of
royalty-producing property where the purchase price is dependent upon
continued productivity of the property,3 3 7 and gain from the sale of
real estate cooperatives whose property is principally located in the other
state. 8 The former are governed under the royalties provision and sub-
ject to the limited 5 percent tax at source;... the latter may be fully
taxed in the source country under the provision pertaining to income
from real property.3 4 The new convention's treatment of shares of real
property corporations as real property conforms to the domestic practice
of France.3 41 Under United States domestic law, they are taxable in the
same fashion as other corporations.
Under the new convention there are three exceptions to the general
rule that capital gains are not subject to tax at source. First, like other
types of investment income, capital gains effectively connected with a
permanent establishment in the source country are subject to tax under
the business profits provision.3 42 Second, an individual deriving capital
gains from the other country does not obtain the benefits of the capital
gains provision if he maintains a fixed base in the source country and
the property giving rise to the gain is effectively connected to the fixed
base." This clause refers to persons who perform personal services in
the other country through a fixed base. It is analogous to the concept
of gains which are effectively connected with a permanent establishment.
Gains which are effectively connected to a fixed base would tend to be
gains that should be regarded as profits from personal services, just as
the performance of the services themselves constitute the purpose of
the fixed base. The source of this provision is the OECD Draft.34 4 The
third exception is the individual who is present in the source country
for more than 183 days during the taxable year. This provision, which
conforms to United States domestic law,3 45 is not found in the OECD
Draft or in French domestic law. It is difficult to justify this 183 day
rule except on the ground that the capital gain is earned substantially
by the acumen of the individual owning the property. Since this individ-
ual is present in the source country for more than one-half the year, the
336. 1967 Convention, art. 12(1).
337. Id., art. 11(4)(b).
338. Id., art. 12(2) (a).
339. Id., art. 11(2).
340. Id., art. 5.
341. See France § 10/6.5.
342. 1967 Convention, art. 12(2)(b).
343. Id., art. 12(2) (c) (i).
344. OECD Draft, art. 13(2); S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1968).
345. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 871(a) (2).
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source country should be able to tax the gain on an analogy to personal
services income. The new capital gains provisions are a substantial im-
provement and tend to conform the 1967 Convention to the other income
tax conventions of the United States.
E. Real Property
Income from real property and royalties on natural resources are
taxable in the source country, as well as income from the sale or ex-
change of those assets. 4 A person may elect to be taxed in the source
country on such real property income as if he were engaged in business
there. 47 This means that he will be allowed the deductions appropriate
to earning the income. These provisions are substantially the same as in
the 1945 Convention. 4 However, the changes make it clear that the
election to be taxed as though business were done in the source country
is only with respect to the real property income, and not with respect to
all income. Furthermore, the net election is available in both countries,
whereas under the old convention, it was only required in the United
States. This provision is in conformity with present United States do-
mestic law,349 although the convention provision allowing that election
was the predecessor of this provision. France has always taxed real
property of nonresidents on a net basis. 0 Such a provision is found in
most United States income tax conventions.
F. Impact on Flow of Investment
The provisions in income tax conventions relating to investment in-
come have several purposes. First, they are designed to reduce tax
impediments to the free flow of capital between the two countries."'
Second, they should eliminate double taxation and prevent fiscal evasion
with respect to the investment income. Third, they should expedite re-
lations between the residents of one country and the taxing authorities
of the other. Fourth, they should provide a reasonable allocation of tax
revenue between the two governments.
The new convention is relatively successful in eliminating tax im-
pediments to the free flow of capital between the two countries. The
limited tax that is authorized for interest and royalties will all be credit-
able in the other country, even at the lowest tax bracket. The capital
346. 1967 Convention, arts. 5(1)-(2) & 12(2)(a).
347. Id., art. 5(3).
348. 1945 Convention, art. 7, as supplemented, 1945 Convention Supplementary Protocol,
art. 7(b).
349. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 871(d).
350. See France §§ 9/4.2 & 11/3.9.
351. Chamber Talk 7.
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gains provision will largely eliminate tax on capital gains in the source
country, thereby removing tax considerations from investment demands
of residents of the two countries. However, there is less success in the
area of dividends. Taxation on the receipt of dividends by United States
individuals (and corporations holding less than 10 percent of the payor's
stock) is relatively neutral. The entire tax imposed on the dividend is
creditable against the United States tax. For corporations holding more
than 10 percent of the payor's stock, the combination of the corporate
income tax and the withholding exceeds the United States tax on the
income, so there is some lack of incentive to invest in French concerns.
However, there would be considerably less incentive to invest in French
concerns in the absence of the new convention. There is also a substan-
tial tax impediment to French investment in United States corporations,
but again, less than there would be without the new convention. This
lack of incentive results almost entirely from the French system of
taxation. The new convention makes some adjustment, but a credit for
taxes paid by the United States corporation could completely remove
impediments to French investment.1 2 Such a credit would partially
defeat the purpose of the recent reforms in French domestic law.
The new convention is successful in preventing double taxation and
fiscal evasion on most investment income. Taxation at source is limited
to a relatively low rate that can, in most cases, be credited against the
normal tax in the country of residence. The new convention provides for
a mandatory credit for this tax. Prevention of fiscal evasion is relatively
easy except for capital gains and real property income. For dividends,
interest, and royalties from the United States, the recipient receives
reduced withholding, either on the basis of his address, or by filing a
simple form in the source country.3  In France, the recipient claims a
refund. Lists of persons who secure reduced withholding or claim refunds
are to be regularly exchanged by the two countries. However, there is
normally no withholding on capital gains or real property income, and
no possible reduction of the latter. For this reason, it is difficult for the
source country to notify the country of residence of the income. While
not serious in the case of real property income, since it is taxed at least
at the source, it might be a serious area of evasion for capital gains.
The administrative procedure worked out by the United States for
securing the reduced rate of tax is easy to follow and does not embroil
the French resident in filing annual returns or seeking refunds. A form
352. See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 902.
353. Treas. Reg. § 514.2(c)(1) (1957) provides for reduced dividend withholding by
address. Treas. Reg. § 514.4(b)-5(b) (1957) provides for reduction in or exemption from




is to be filed at the beginning of the year entitling the withholding agent
to reduce the rate of withholding set in the convention." 4 If France sets
up a similar system (as the inclusion of the precompte in the list of taxes
covered indicates it will), simplicity for the taxpayer will be achieved.
The new convention does nothing in the investment income area to
provide a reasonable allocation of the tax revenue between the two gov-
ernments. The provisions are designed to assure that the entire tax will
be collected by the country of residence except on dividends and royal-
ties, where a small tax is collected at the source. Since most industrialized
countries have a similar corporate tax rate of 50 percent, it should be
easy for the two countries to agree on taxation at source at a 25 percent
rate on investment income, thereby splitting the revenue. However, it
should immediately be apparent that the goal of allocating revenue is
inconsistent with the other goals, such as reducing impediments to the
flow of investment, eliminating double taxation, and reducing administra-
tive annoyance for the taxpayer. For this reason, taxes have been kept
minimal in the source country. It should be recognized that this repre-
sents a conscious policy choice, rather than the more specious basis from
which it has been viewed.
V. PERSONAL SERVICE INCOME
The provisions relating to personal service income are not changed in
significant respects in the 1967 Convention. For the most part, the
changes consist of modifications, modernizations, and clarifications of
language contained in the 1945 Convention.
Although there are no basic changes relating to personal service income
in the 1967 Convention, the failure to include United States state and
local taxes within the convention for purposes of the personal service
provisions is difficult to understand except in terms of the theory of
federalism. Under the provisions of the new convention, certain indi-
viduals temporarily present in the United States are spared federal
income tax because of the briefness of their contact and the convenience
this provides them. When these individuals are unexpectedly subject to
state or local levies, they are occasionally financially embarrassed and
usually annoyed." The convenience of exemption therefore partially
disappears. Despite anguished screams of states rights, a provision
which would include state and local taxes in a convention would be de-
sirable. The same result can be attained by persuading the states involved
to exempt from their state income tax those persons exempt from federal




tax by convention358 As related to the provision dealing with govern-
mental functions in the 1967 Convention, only a few jurisdictions would
be involved, such as California, the District of Columbia, Illinois, New
York, and Pennsylvania. However, the other Convention provisions
would require concurrence of all states to be effective.
A. Governmental Functions
Under the 1945 Convention, compensation (including pensions) paid
by a country or a political subdivision thereof to individuals residing in
the other country was exempt from tax in the residence state. Nationals
of the recipient state were not included in the exemption.3 57 The pro-
vision in the 1967 Convention is less liberal than the former convention
or the OECD Draft.'. 8 Remuneration (including pensions) paid by a
country or a political subdivision thereof is taxable only in the source
state, but the 1967 Convention provision is limited to (1) nationals of
the source state and (2) payment for services rendered in discharge of
governmental functions3 59 Thus, nationals of third countries, formerly
protected, are denied the benefits of the 1967 Convention. In addition,
there is no attempt to solve the many problems which may arise in trying
to determine what might be a legitimate governmental functionyro This
varies from state to state, and, while France and the United States do
not differ strikingly, perhaps the principal difference relates to the instru-
356. Under D.C. Code Ann. § 47-1557a(b) (7) (1967), gross income does not include
income to the extent required to be excluded by United States tax convention obligations.
This probably does not include amounts excluded from gross income for federal income tax
purposes, as its apparent purpose is to exempt no more than the tax conventions require.
Some state statutes incorporate the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 within their definition of gross
income, thereby including section 894 of the Code, which excludes from gross income amounts
excluded by tax convention. E.g., Hawaii Rev. Laws § 121-1 (Supp. 1965).
357. 1945 Convention, art. 8, as supplemented, 1945 Convention Supplementary Protocol,
art. 7(c).
358. See OECD Draft, art. 19.
359. The United States has taken the position that Article 14(A) of the 1945 Convention
(the savings clause) limited the application of Article 8 (governmental functions) to citizens
of France. Treas. Reg. § 514.110(a) (1946); Foreign Tax U IX/10H(3). The language of
Article 14(A), that the United States may tax its residents as though the Convention had not
come into effect, 'does not justify this interpretation as it would justify the complete gutting
of the governmental services provision. On the other hand, it can be argued that since a
literal reading of Article 14(A) would destroy the governmental services exemption, Article
8 must be read literally and, therefore, should be outside the limits of Article 14(A). The
savings clause is specifically made inapplicable to the government services provision in the
new convention. 1967 Convention, art. 22(4) (a) (iii).
360. French Republic v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Ky. 18, 252 S.W. 124 (1923). See
generally L. Orfield & E. Re, Cases & Materials On International Law c. 11 (1955).
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ments of transportation and communications, which are governmentally
operated in France. However, this presents no problem, since French
communications workers are unlikely to be in the United States, and
special convention provisions govern ship and aircraft crews.30 1 These
provisions do not apply to ground personnel such as mechanics and ticket
sellers, etc. Government payments for non-governmental services are
taxable under the other personal service provisions.30 2
In the case of individuals with dual nationality, the 1967 Convention
provides that each country may tax its own nationals, but must consider
income paid by a country or its political subdivisions to be income
sourced in the paying country.63 The paying country would thereby
have the prior right to tax that income, and the other country would
credit the tax.
B. Dependent Personal Services
The treatment of income from employment is similar in both the 1945
and 1967 Conventions. A resident of one country is exempt from tax on
compensation for personal services performed in the other country if the
employee was present in the latter country for less than one-half of
his fiscal year.38 This is the familiar 183 day rule common to all income
tax conventions. The 1945 Convention contained an additional proviso
that the services must have been performed for an enterprise of the
individual's residence state, or for a permanent establishment of an
enterprise of the state of performance if the permanent establishment
was located in the residence state.3" An employee of a permanent estab-
lishment of a third country enterprise might have been subjected to
double taxation under this proviso because his residence and his em-
ployer's residence did not coincide. The comparable provision of the
1967 Convention provides that to be eligible for exclusion, the compensa-
tion may not be paid by a resident of the source state or the expense
borne by a permanent establishment located in the state of performance.
The 1967 Convention is more stringent as it provides that remuneration
may not be paid by a permanent establishment in the source country.00
While narrower in this respect, it expands coverage to possible third
parties and shifts the emphasis from whom the services are performed
for to the business-accounting criterion of who bears the expense of
361. 1967 Convention, art. 15(3).
362. Id., art. 16(2).
363. Id., art. 16(3).
364. Id., art. 15(2).
365. 1945 Convention, art. 9, as supplemented, 1945 Convention Supplementary Protocol,
art. 9.
366. S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1968).
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performance. The term "borne" should be interpreted to mean deducted
from income. Its purpose is to eliminate the exemption where the salary
paid would be a deductible expense in the same country. Either the pay-
ment must be excluded from bookkeeping in the country of performance,
or it must be included in its entirety. The symmetry of the clause is
laudable, but one wonders at its practicality. The payor's bookkeeping
is likely to be out of the control of the employee. Also, if the purpose of
the provision is to reduce tax harassment, whether or not the salary is
borne in the performance country is irrelevant. This provision conforms
to the OECD Draft,36 which regrettably provides no explanation as to
its meaning. One justification advanced for this provision is that there
is no fixed dollar maximum on the amount of income that can be excluded
in this fashion, as there is in other United States tax conventions.3' s The
provision is thus designed to prevent avoidance of tax by high income
taxpayers who control permanent establishments in the performance
country, and could otherwise arrange their affairs in a most advantageous
manner. This provision only prevents avoidance in this one area. A fixed
dollar limitation would be a better check on possible wide abuse of this
provision. Its advantage would be that an individual with a sizeable
income can afford to hire professional help in the performance country to
adjust his taxes, whereas a low income individual whose salary is borne
by a permanent establishment in the performance country is subject to
the necessity of dealing with two governments.
Under the 1967 Convention, personal services income of ship and
aircraft crews is taxable only in the residence state of the owner, if the
craft is registered therein.30 9 This provision has the same basic justifica-
tion of preventing allocation difficulties and securing certainty for the
parties as the provision dealing with shipping profits.370 It is more neces-
sary in this case, since the taxpayers are unlikely to possess the means of
litigating tax controversies and are too mobile to successfully do so. 3 7 '
C. Teachers
The 1967 Convention contains a specific provision relating to
teachers.372 Although similar provisions appear in other tax conventions,
the inclusion of the special provision in the new convention followed a
series of acrimonious disputes between teachers of one country and the
tax authorities of the other. The disputes arose primarily from the
367. OECD Draft, art. 15(1)-(2).
368. OECD Draft Commentary 131; see text accompanying note 393 infra.
369. 1967 Convention, art. 15(3).
370. See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
371. OECD Draft, art. 15(3).
372. 1967 Convention, art. 17.
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liberal profession article of the 1945 Convention,'7 8 since that conven-
tion contained no specific provision dealing with teachers. France de-
fined the term "exercise of a liberal profession" to include only indepen-
dent activities. 74 On the other hand, the United States took the position
that a liberal profession involved activities which required qualitative
judgments.87 5 However, since "liberal profession" is a term of art in
French domestic tax law and unknown to United States domestic law,
the French definition should have been given the greatest weight. Finally,
and reluctantly, the Internal Revenue Service accepted the French usage.
Since teachers are always employed, the Internal Revenue Service ruled
that French teachers in the United States were not exempt from tax
under the 1945 Convention provision. 70 That ruling placed teaching
under the less favorable rules for dependent personal services.3 77 The
change of position of the United States was made in the name of
reciprocity to induce France to change its ruling. When the 1967 Con-
vention was being negotiated, the position of France changed, and the
United States, accordingly, re-established its favorable view for
teachers. 78
The 1967 Convention permits teachers to visit an accredited institu-
tion, for a maximum of two years, for teaching, research, or both, free of
tax in the source state.879 This eminently sensible solution averts two
undesirable effects. First, the integrity of the French definition of
"liberal profession" in its domestic law is not threatened. Second, it
avoids the anomalous result reached under other tax conventions that
foreign professors in the United States teaching one course and conduct-
ing research are exempt from United States tax, while professors en-
gaged solely in research are not.3 0 The new provision on teachers, which
does not apply to income from research if such research is undertaken
373. 1945 Convention, art. 10.
374. France § 8/1.1c, at 447; see Rev. Rul. 92, 1964-1 Cure. Bull., pt. 1, at 599, 600.
375. Rev. Rul. 313, 1960-2 Cur. Bull. 627; Rev. Rul. 508, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 775.
376. Rev. Rul. 92, 1964-1 Cum. Bull., pt. 1, at 599, 600.
377. 1945 Convention, art. 9.
378. Rev. Rul. 353, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 705; Rev. Rul. 357, 1966-2 Cum. Bull. 564; T.I.R.
No. 833, July 12, 1966.
379. 1967 Convention, art. 17(1) ; see Rev. Rul. 357, 1966-2 Cum. Bull. 564. This has been
amplified by Rev. Rul. 353, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 705, holding that a French professor engaged
in research activities in the United States is exempt from income tax under the 1945
Convention. In essence, the ruling holds that research is a sufficiently common adjunct to
typical academic duties to preclude limiting the term "professor" to those individuals having
only teaching responsibilities.
380. See, e.g., United Kingdom Convention, art. XVIII; Rev. Rul. 23, 1960-2 Cum. Bull.
754; Rev. Rul. 508, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 775.
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primarily for the private benefit of a specific person, has been quite
common in past United States tax conventions. 38'
The two year provision creates the possibility of double exemption for
United States teachers who are temporarily in France. United States
domestic law allows an individual who is abroad for at least five hundred
and ten days, during an eighteen month period, to exclude from his gross
income up to $20,000 of earned income from sources abroad.' s' The
1967 Convention allows a United States teacher teaching in France for
up to two years an exemption from French income tax. Combining the
two provisions, such a United States teacher would pay no income tax on
his teaching income. One solution would be to limit the convention's
exemption to individuals who are out of the country for no more than
five hundred and nine days out of an eighteen month period. The other
solution would be to require that the income earned outside the country
be includable in income for United States tax purposes0a No such
problem exists on the French side, however." 4
The two year provision raises another problem. If a teacher remains
abroad for more than two years, does he lose the exemption for the first
two years that he was abroad? It can be argued that since the purpose of
the exemption is to eliminate the necessity of dealing with foreign tax
administrators when you are in the country for only a limited period of
time, a longer stay should subject you to full source country liability.
However, the better result would be to retain the benefits of the conven-
tion already used. Taxability at that late date would impose a burden
on the teacher to find three years' taxes in one year, and would involve
him in the refund procedures of his home country in order to secure
381. Cf. Norway Convention, art. XII. There is no comparable provision in the OECD
Draft.
382. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 911(a) (2), (c) (1).
383. Such a provision is found in the tax convention that the United States entered into
with the Union of South Africa, Protocol Supplementing in Certain Respects the Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and for Establishing Rules of Reciprocal Administra-
tive Assistance with Respect to Taxes on Income Which Was Signed at Pretoria on
December 13, 1946, July 14, 1950, art. II(1), [1952] 3 U.S.T. 3541, TI.A.S. No. 2510 (effec-
tive July 15, 1952), 2 CCH Tax Treaties fI 7952 (1968) [hereinafter cited as South Africa con-
vention Protocol], supplementing Convention with the Union of South Africa for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and for Establishing Rules of Reciprocal Admini trative
Assistance with Respect to Taxes on Income, December 13, 1946, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 3821,
T.IA.S. No. 2510 (effective July 15, 1952), 2 CCH Tax Treaties f1 7903 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as South Africa Convention].
Rev. RuL 122, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 193, holds that excludable income is outside the exemption
provided for in this convention.
384. France § 11/2.11.
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proper credit for the taxes paid. Nor should a rule that depends on the
teacher's intention at the time of beginning the visit be adopted. Proof of
one's intent three years previous would be difficult at best, and would
result in conflicting results in similar cases. Furthermore, an individual
can benefit by more than one of the personal services articles in succes-
sive years up to a limit of five." 5 The implication of this is that the
length of the stay in the foreign country is not dispositive. Finally, the
language of the provision itself leads to the same conclusion:
An individual . . . who . . . visits the latter Contracting State for the primary
purpose of teaching or engaging in research . . . shall be exempt from tax by the
latter Contracting State on his income from personal services for teaching or research
... for a period not exceeding 2 years . . .. 38
It is clear that the exemption may not exceed two years; however,
nothing is said of the duration of the employment in the 1967 Conven-
tion. 8
D. Students and Trainees
Students abroad, under the 1945 Convention, were exempt in the
country of study from tax only on remittances from their home coun-
tries."8 ' The 1967 Convention has broadened this coverage by adding
professional trainees and persons studying or doing research under a
grant from a charitable organization. 89 Students on grants also represent
an additional extention since the grant may be paid by sources in either
country while taxable only in the students' residence country. D° Finally,
income from personal services performed in the country of study (to a
maximum of $2,000 per year) may be excluded from tax in that
country."9' Since students often are present in one country for a period
of years, this last provision is a reasonable recognition of the importance
of permitting them to maintain themselves by supplementing whatever
funds they receive from abroad. In addition, the inclusion of this broad
provision in the 1967 Convention appears to be a recognition of the
extent of private and organized student exchange between the contracting
states. The exclusion simplifies the income reporting burden for a class of
persons commonly believed to be unfamiliar and unconcerned with
practical and administrative matters.
The exemption is new to United States-France tax conventions and
385. 1967 Convention, arts. 18(1)(c) & 21(2).
386. Id., art. 17(1).
387. Rev. Ru. 236, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 193.
388. 1945 Convention, art. 12. The OECD Draft is in accord. OECD Draft, art. 20.
389. 1967 Convention, art. 18(1) (a), (b) (i).
390. Id., art. 18(1) (b) (ii).
391. Id., art. 18(1) (b) (iii).
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has no parallel in the OECD Draft, but is found in several other United
States tax conventions. Since the benefits are relatively generous, they
are extended only for the time that is reasonably or customarily required
to complete the studies. There is an outside limit of five years placed on
the benefit of the student and teacher provisions combined 92
The 1967 Convention also offers an exemption for personal services
income of employees of a resident of one of the contracting states who is
temporarily present in the other to study, or to acquire technical, pro-
fessional or business experience. This exemption is limited to one year
and $5,000. 3 This appears to be a specialized loosening of the 183 day
rule in the dependent personal services article which, for indexing pur-
poses, fits better in article 18(2).
E. Pensions and Annuities
The state of the recipients residence has the exclusive right to tax
alimony payments, annuities, and private pensions under the 1967 Con-
vention. 94 Except for the addition of alimony, this provision con-
stitutes no change from the 1945 Convention.3 The old convention used
the term "life annuity." '396 However, there was no requirement that
annuities be measured by a lifetime. They could be measured by a term
of years. 9 7 Thus, the new convention rectifies a surface ambiguity of the
former convention. 9
The new convention defines pensions as periodic payments made after
retirement in consideration of, or for injuries sustained in, past employ-
ment. 9' The definition seems to be unexceptional. 00
Social security payments are the subject of a special provision in the
1967 Convention which permits the taxation of such payments only by
the payor country." 1 This provision is a limited reversal of a recent
United States ruling, which permitted taxation of foreign pensions in
392. Id., art. 18(1)(c).
393. Id., art. 18(2).
394. Id., art. 19. This would seem to solve the problem of the United States citizen who
marries a foreigner and, after divorce, returns to the United States and receives alimony. See
Kragen 311 n.19.
395. 1945 Convention, art. 8.
396. Id.
397. 1945 Convention Protocol, art. IV.
398. See 1967 Convention, art. 19(3).
399. Id., art. 19(4).
400. The OECD draft does not define the term "pensions," OECD Draft, art. 18, but the
Commentary indicates that widows' and orphans' pensions and annuities for past employment
are covered. OECD Draft Commentary 135. However, there is no mention of disability
payments.
401. 1967 Convention, art. 20.
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spite of their similarity to United States social security payments. °2 The
United States and France differ radically in the timing of taxation of
social security payments. The United States includes the taxpayer's
contribution in his gross income when earned, but does not tax the
benefits upon distribution. 403 France, on the other hand, excludes the
taxpayer's contribution when earned and taxes the benefits in the year
paid.404 By French administrative action, a recipient whose total retire-
ment income is small may be exempted from tax on his pension.4 " Thus,
without the provision in the new convention, a recipient of United States
social security who is residing in France would be subject to double
taxation and, under present United States domestic law, a recipient of
French social security could be denied an administratively granted ex-
emption. Granting exclusive taxing power over social security payments
to the paying country provides a salutary solution to possible conflicts
which would involve a group of persons who would be least capable of
financing private solutions. Although such a provision is not found in
the OECD Draft, its incorporation would be advantageous.
F. Independent Personal Services
The treatment of income from independent personal services partakes
of both dependent personal services and business profits. Income is ex-
empt from tax in the source country unless the individual was either
present, or maintained a fixed base, in the source country for more than
183 days during the taxable year.406 Taxation on the basis of presence
aligns the provision with dependent personal services. The concept of
fixed base is quite similar to the permanent establishment concept fa-
miliar to business profits taxation. Presumably, it requires a fixed place
of business belonging to the individual or usable primarily by him. How
fixed the base must be, or how exclusive the use is not clear.
The new convention defines independent personal services as all ac-
tivities (other than industrial, commercial, or agricultural) carried on
independently by a profit-seeking, loss-bearing individual.40 7 This defini-
402. See Rev. Rul. 34, 1966-1 Cum. Bull. 22, which revoked Rev. Rul. 135, 1956-1 Cum.
Bull. 56. However, foreign social security payments are treated like other annuities under
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 72.
403. I.T. 3447, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 191-92; 1 J. Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 7.45
(1969).
404. See France § 8/1.9b.
405. Id. §§ 9/1.9b nA0 & 12/1.6c.
406. 1967 Convention, art. 14(1), (2). This provision was adapted from Article 14(1) of
the OECD Draft, with the 183 day rule for dependent personal services that is used In the
Draft read into the new convention in order to provide more certainty for the slippery
concept of fixed base.
407. 1967 Convention, art. 14(3).
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tion is better than the OECD Draft which refers to professional services
and, rather than defining the term, illustrates it by referring specifically
to independent scientific, literary, artistic, educational or teaching ac-
tivities. The OECD Draft illustration also includes physicians, lawyers,
engineers, architects, dentists, and accountants who are engaged in
independent activities. 40 8 Thus, a more precise definition might have
been inserted to avoid application of the rule of ejusdem generis to
eliminate a number of other independent activities of the artisan class
that the countries wished to include. More important, the application of
this rule might have eliminated entertainers, an important group that is
considered in United States tax negotiations. The new convention is a
remarkable coup for the United States because no dollar limit is imposed
on the exemption of income from personal services in the source country.
Many countries have used a limit or a special provision to prevent
entertainers, who earn a great deal of money in a limited amount of time,
from exporting large amounts of it without being subject to tax.40
G. Other Personal Services Income
The 1967 Convention does not refer to several types of income com-
monly covered by other tax conventions. One such type is directors' fees
and similar payments. Under the OECD Draft,410 these payments could
be taxed in the state in which the corporation is a resident. This provi-
sion is justified on the ground that it is sometimes difficult to ascertain
where the directors' services are performed 4 1' The problem is usually
not treated in United States tax conventions because directors' fees in
United States corporations differ substantially from those in European
corporations. In the United States, a director of a corporation may re-
ceive little more than expenses for his participation in directors' meet-
ings, or he may receive a sizeable sum.4 1 2 In Europe, on the other hand,
directors commonly receive three types of remuneration. They sometimes
receive compensation for personal services, allowances for attendance at
directors' meetings, and directors' fees that constitute profit sharing
payments 4 13 In the United States, those payments would all be taxed as
personal services income. The omission of these matters from the new
408. OECD Draft, art. 14.
409. See, e.g., Agreement between Israel and France for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Establishment of Rules for Reciprocal Administrative Assistance with respect to Taxes
on Income, Aug. 20, 1963, art. 17, 9 U.N. Int'l Tax Agreements A. (1) No. 116, at 5.
410. OECD Draft, art. 16. The United States entered no reservation to this provision, but
Canada did. OECD Draft Commentary 133.
411. OECD Draft Commentary 133.
412. See H. Ballantine, Corporations § 73, at 187 & § 74, at 189 (rev. ed. 1946).
413. France § 8/32, at 479 & § 9/25, at 506-07.
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convention means that the United States will subject directors' fees to
the personal services provision. However, France will probably continue
to tax directors' fees under its domestic rules.
A second class of personal services income not given special treatment
is that received by artists and athletes. The OECD Draft4"4 provides
that regardless of the provisions of the personal services articles, the
income of public entertainers, including athletes, may be taxed in the
country in which the activity is carried on. The OECD Draft takes an
uncertain position, realizing that many countries will wish to treat
athletes and artists under the normal provisions, and suggests that full
taxability only be decreed when the public entertainer is acting inde-
pendently.418 This suggestion would only serve as a trap for the unwary
since a public entertainer can incorporate himself, thus becoming subject
to the dependent personal services provision while the corporation re-
mains subject to the business profits provision. 410 The new convention
leaves this possibility open, and taxes the remuneration of public enter-
tainers as dependent or independent personal services as the case may
be. In view of the past adverse reaction of the United States Senate to
any contrary suggestion, this is probably necessary. 17
In addition to normal compensation, the personal services provisions
apply specifically to reimbursed traveling expenses, 41 8 but such expenses
are not considered in computing the maximum exemption for students
or trainees.4 19
The close interrelationship of the personal services provisions raises
the possibility that an individual may qualify under more than one of
them. The new convention provides that only one of these provisions
(the most favorable one) may be utilized in any taxable year. There is
a further limitation under the student's and teacher's provisions as to
tacking years together.42°
H. Additional Personal Deduction
Since the late 1940's, a strange provision has governed the taxation of
American businessmen in France. In view of the declared fact that these
persons received greater salaries than would otherwise be the case, due
to the increased cost of living, traveling, and maintaining two residences,
the French Government promised to
414. OECD Draft, art. 17.
415. OECD Draft Commentary 134.
416. See text accompanying notes 109-204 supra.
417. S. Exec. Rep. No. 4, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), S. Exec. Doc. F, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-3 (1946).
418. 1967 Convention, art. 21(1).
419. Id., art. 21(2).
420. See text accompanying note 392 supra.
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proceed in a liberal spirit . . to examine each particular case in order to establish,
if necessary before the establishment of the American companies in France, exactly
what will be the situation of their personnel with regard to the Schedular Tax on
salaries and wages (having regard in particular to the importance of the professional
expenses the deduction of which might be authorized in the computation of the
tax).421
The practical effect of this provision has been the allowance of a special
deduction of 20 percent of the income earned in France for the supposed
extra expenses of travel, living, and maintaining two residences. No other
nation enjoys such a privilege. The United States secured it when it was
prosperous and France lay prostrate from the havoc of World War II.
This provision has been eliminated from the new convention,4  since the
justifications therefore-the encouragement of United States investment
in France in pre-Marshall Plan days, and the establishment of allow-
ances for extraordinary French living costs occasioned by post-war
shortages-have long since vanished. In fact, the present policy of the
United States and France is to try to discourage direct American invest-
ment in France. Furthermore, as the note establishing the deduction set
forth, most United States citizens had been receiving a greater than
normal salary to compensate for any additional expenses. Most corporate
employees also had generous expense allowances. Moreover, the present
exclusion of the first $20,000 earned from gross income if the individual
is outside the United States for five hundred and ten days during an
eighteen month period423 also eases the financial problem of living abroad.
Finally, the special deduction goes far beyond the principles of national
treatment and nondiscrimination to provide a tax boon for citizens of one
particular foreign country. Its elimination is therefore welcome, and may
reduce some friction between the two countries.
I. Imputed Income From Rentals
The domestic law of France provides for a type of minimum tax. An
individual who is not domiciled in France, but who possesses one or more
residences in France, is taxed on the higher of his actual income from
French sources or five times the rental value of his French residences 424
421. S. Exec. Rep. No. 7, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1948); Third Tax Convention 210.
422. No mention of this change is found in the legislative history, but an exchange of
notes between Ambassador Bohlen of the United States and Secretary General Alphand of
France makes it dear that the notes, minutes, and arrangements between the two countries
with respect to prior tax conventions are abrogated. The specific mention that arrangements
with respect to motion picture royalties are not thereby changed should add a negative
implication, if any is needed, that unmentioned provisions are also changed. S. Exec. Doc.
N, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1967).
423. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 911(a) (2). Chommie § 241, at 601.
424. France § 11/3.9b. This is a very different kind of tax than that proposed by some
commentators on imputed income from owner-occupied residences. The theory of such a
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on the ground that most people spend 20 percent of their income for
housing.425 The new convention prohibits the imposition of such a tax on
presumed income by either country,426 and will be urged wherever ap-
propriate by the United States in future tax convention negotiations.
VI. PREVENTION OF DOUBLE TAXATION
Since France does not tax all the income of its residents and corpora-
tions, it has encountered problems of double exemption under tax con-
ventions that it has negotiated with other countries. Where income is
exempt from tax in the source country, and France does not impose a
tax on that income either, the income is therefore subject to no tax. In
order to rectify this situation, France adopted a rule which provides that
despite the lack of any taxing provision in the French Code, all income,
the taxation of which is attributed to France by a tax convention, is
taxable in France.42 7 The new convention provides that this rule of law
shall not be applied to United States residents428 Double exemption is
unlikely to occur, as the United States taxes the world-wide income of its
residents. Although the clause is couched in reciprocal language, the
United States has no such rule. A tax convention may not increase the
taxes imposed by the United States under present rules.429
A. United States
The United States may generally tax its citizens and residents as
though the new convention had not been signed.480 This is due to the
general savings clause found in all United States tax conventions. To this
clause there are numerous exceptions. If there were no exceptions, the
negotiation of a tax convention would be futile. The savings clause does
not apply to social security payments or to the provisions of the non-
discrimination provision.41  Thus, United States residents receiving
social security payments from France need not include them in their
gross income. The savings clause also does not apply to students or
teachers other than citizens of the United States or persons with immi-
proposed tax is that income is actually earned from such occupation and should be included
in the tax base. W. Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation 18-19 (1947).
425. France § 11/3.9b, at 772 n.215.
426. 1967 Convention, art. 23(3).
427. France § 11/4.18.
428. 1967 Convention, art. 22(3). See S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, 90th Cong., 2d Sems. 38 (1968);
S. Exec. Doc. N, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1967). The old convention contained no such
provision since the rule was incorporated into French domestic law in 1959.
429. Of course, it is theoretically possible for a self-executing treaty to amend a statute
so as to impose a United States tax, but this author knows of no instance in which It has
occurred.
430. 1967 Convention, art. 22(4)(a).
431. Id., art. 22(4) (a) (i).
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grant status in the United States.4 12 The exclusions for individuals who
have immigrant status in the United States is an attempt to confine con-
vention benefits to persons who were, before they began their study, and
will be, after they complete their study, residents of France. The savings
clause is also not applicable to the governmental functions provision with
respect to an individual not a citizen of the United States and who does
not have immigrant status, and an individual with immigrant status who
elects to claim the benefits of the governmental functions provision. In
that case, the person may not use the years of benefit toward residence in
the United States that is required for naturalization.4 33 This provision
is designed to cope with United States rules on residency, which
provide that when an alien is present in the United States without
intending to leave at a particular time, he is a resident of the United
States. 434 The length of time spent in the United States may be sig-
nificant in determining the intent of the alien. This would make most
employees of the French government in the United States residents
of the United States and thus not entitled to the benefits of the conven-
tion. In order to preserve these convention benefits, an exemption to the
savings clause has been made. The special exemption for persons onimmigrant visas has been added to accomodate certain French citizens
who are present in the United States on this type of visa. They are
permitted either the tax benefits of the convention or the right to accrue
that residency for naturalization purposes.435 The rationale behind the
rule is that any person who is planning to become a United States citizen
should not gain benefits accorded only to foreign residents.
The United States will allow its citizens and residents credit for in-
come tax paid to France. The credit shall be based on the amount of
French tax paid but shall not exceed that portion of the United States
tax which net income from sources within France bears to the total
net income.4  This continues the provisions of the 1945 Convention,)43
which generally required some type of credit along the lines traditionally
provided by United States domestic law.438 The intention of the provision
in the 1967 Convention is to specify the general method of relief without
tying the United States to any particular provisions, such as the per-
country limitation or the overall limitation.4 9 The new convention spe-
cifies the per-country limitation, but not as an exclusive method of relief.
432. Id., art. 22(4) (a) (ii).
433. Id., art. 22(4) (a) (iii) ; see S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1968).
434. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1960).
435. S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1968).
436. 1967 Convention, art. 23(1).
437. 1945 Convention, art. 14(A).
438. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 901-05.




France has traditionally utilized only the exemption method for reliev-
ing double taxation. This results in considerably less unilateral relief
from double taxation than that which the United States provides. For
example, a French citizen and domiciliary is subject to French tax on his
income from both French and foreign sources. 440 However, he may take
a deduction for foreign taxes paid on income from foreign sources.
41
Thus, the tax is levied on his net income from abroad. This means that,
in the absence of a tax convention, the French individual pays full foreign
taxes on all his foreign income, and almost full domestic taxes.
In the 1967 Convention, there is slightly more unilateral relief for
corporations than for individuals. Business income earned by foreign
branches and permanent establishments of corporations resident in
France is not subject to corporate tax.442 An exemption is also given for
income derived from foreign real estate,443 interest,444 royalties,44" and
capital gains,446 if they are connected with the activities of such perma-
nent establishments. Income from foreign joint ventures (but not partner-
ships) is likewise excluded from the corporation tax.447 Thus, French
corporations are subject to tax in France on income earned in France,
and on foreign income not effectively connected with a permanent estab-
lishment located outside of France. These provisions, in themselves,
constitute a substantial deterrent to French individuals and corporations
making portfolio investments outside of France, as they will be subject
to both French and foreign taxes.
Under the new convention, France avoids double taxation of income
by a combination of the exemption and credit methods. Where income is
taxable in both countries under the convention, France will allow its
residents credit for United States tax paid on United States source
income up to the amount of French tax levied on such income. 445 Income
taxable in the United States which is not taxable in France by virtue
of a tax convention shall be exempt from French taxation a. 4' 1 However,
French tax may be computed on income taxable in France at the rate
appropriate to the total of the income chargeable under French domestic
440. France § 11/1.2b.
441. Id. §§ 11/2.8e & .lla.
442. Id. § 11/2.4a, at 716.
443. Id. § 11/2.7a.
444. Id. § 11/2.8a, at 734.
445. See id. § 11/2.9, at 738-39. But royalties are considered to arise from the development
of the patent, not its use. Id.
446. Id. § 11/2.10b, at 739-40.
447. Id. § 11/2.13, at 742.
448. 1967 Convention, art. 23(2)(b).
449. Id., art. 23(2)(a).
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law.4 50 This means that in determining the rate bracket of the income
that is taxable under the progressive system in France, the total of the
income earned by the resident may be included. It will be considered to
come off the bottom brackets, rather than the top brackets, in its exemp-
tion from French tax.
While the United States relief from double taxation only restates its
domestic law, France provides substantial relief which the United States
will seek from other convention partners whose unilateral provisions are
not as comprehensive as those of France.
C. Nondiscrimination
The nondiscrimination provision of the 1967 Convention is yet an-
other instrument for avoiding double taxation. It applies to all taxes
levied by the contracting states and their political subdivisions. 5 1 There
are three situations in which discrimination is prohibited. First, residents
of a contracting state must not be subject to "more burdensome taxes"
than other residents who are citizens of that state.452 Whether the United
States presently complies with this standard is quite doubtful. At present,
there are many provisions of United States domestic law that apply only
to its citizens. 453 All of these provisions should be available to United
States residents who are French citizens under the new convention. The
nondiscrimination provision would seem to apply only to individuals,
since corporations are not citizens.45 4 Second, a state may not tax a
permanent establishment of a resident of the other country less favor-
ably than it does a resident of its own country who carries on the same
activities, except for the application of a branch profits tax15 This pro-
vision does not protect a corporation engaged in trade or business in the
United States which does not have a permanent establishment here 50
The United States may still levy its 30 percent tax on gross income that
is not effectively connected with a United States trade or business.4
Third, a corporation of a country whose capital is owned or controlled by
a resident of the other country must not be more heavily burdened than
a similar corporation owned or controlled by a resident of the country
450. Id., art. 23(2)(c).
451. See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra.
452. 1967 Convention, art. 24(1).
453. E.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 901(b), 911(a) (2), 931(a), 1303(b), 6013(a) (1)
& 6851(d); see Foreign Tax 1 IX/11F(1); Lidstone, Liberal Construction of Tax Treaties-
An Analysis of Congressional and Administrative Limitations of an Old Doctrine, 47 Cornell
L.Q. 529, 541-47 (1962).
454. Foreign Tax 9 IX/11E(1).
455. 1967 Convention, art. 24(2). The source of this provision is Artide 24(4) of the
OECD Draft
456. See Foreign Tax ff IX/11E(1).
457. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 881(a).
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of incorporation. 418 Although the nondiscrimination clause in the 1945
Convention was not complex and did not specifically enumerate these
possible instances of discrimination, it would have prohibited each one
of the enumerated instances of discrimination. 410 Thus, the 1967 Con-
vention represents only a change toward more specificity. There is no
problem in the United States with the second or third requirements
(other than the one set forth). Any discrimination would be against cor-
porations owned primarily by United States citizens, such as controlled
foreign corporations. 460 It might even be contended that this does not
constitute unequal treatment of the corporation, since the additional tax
is imposed upon the United States shareholder.401
The nondiscrimination clause is as yet unlitigated, and likely to con-
tinue in its present form. It would appear that some of the discrimina-
tions against nonresident aliens could easily be eliminated from United
States domestic law by the promulgation of tax conventions. 02
VII. ADINiSTRATIVE PROVISIONS
The administrative provisions of the 1967 Convention, in general,
represent a triumph of substance over form. The substance in the new
convention is similar to that found in the old convention, but the form
is considerably more specific.
A. Mutual Agreement Procedure
The 1945 Convention provided that any taxpayer who demonstrated
that the action of the contracting state resulted in double taxation could
lodge a claim with his country, and the two countries would endeavor
to reach an agreement to equitably avoid double taxation.48 In addition,
the old convention permitted the competent authorities to establish rules
for the apportionment of business profits .4  The new convention con-
tinues these provisions, but makes them more specific. For example, the
resident who feels that he will be subject to double taxation may present
his case to the state of his residence. 45 Thereupon, the competent au-
thorities endeavor to agree on the resolution of any difficulties. 00 In
458. 1967 Convention, art. 24(3). Article 24(5) of the OECD Draft is the source for this
provision.
459. 1945 Convention Protocol, art. V.
460. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 951-72.
461. Id. § 951(a) (1); OECD Draft Commentary 154.
462. See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6013(a) (1).
463. 1945 Convention Supplementary Protocol, art. 14.
464. 1945 Convention, art. 3.
465. 1967 Convention, art. 25(1).
466. Id., art. 25(2). Note the difference between this provision and the mandatory language
of Article 3(3) requiring agreement. See text accompanying note 88 supra. Quaere whether
there is any practical difference?
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particular, they will reach agreement on three possible joint courses of
action: (1) the same attribution of business profits to a resident and its
permanent establishment in the other state;4 7 (2) the same allocation
of income between a resident and a related person;4"' and (3) the same
determination of the source of particular items of income.?'0 These pro-
visions add no substance to the old convention, but their specification
adds to the likelihood that the competent authorities will feel impelled
to actually reach agreement.
The most important substantive change from the old convention is
that when the competent authorities reach agreement, taxes will be im-
posed and a refund or credit shall be allowed in accord with the agree-
ment.470 This means that the statutes of limitation under the domestic
laws of the contracting states will be disregarded 7 This authorization is
necessary in both the United States and France, because the fiscal au-
thorities of both nations are prevented by law from making payments
after the expiration of the statutes of limitation.472 This provision is a
step in the right direction. A further step is that contained in the OECD
Draft: "More detailed rules and procedures for re-allocating income
between related enterprises will be considered by the Fiscal Committee
in its future work."47 3 The drafters of this provision presumably took
into account the experience of the United States with its regulations
promulgated under section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code
4
B. Exchange of Information
The 1967 Convention provides that the competent authorities of the
two contracting states shall exchange information for the purpose of
implementing the convention and for the prevention of fraud or fiscal
evasion with respect to income taxes. Such information may be exchanged
either routinely or, in particular cases, upon request. The competent
authorities shall agree on the list of information to be routinely fur-
nished475 and, in all probability, the following will be included: payments
of dividends, interests, royalties, and annuities from United States per-
sons to persons with French addresses who have secured the reduced
withholding rate under the convention's withholding regulations and
467. 1967 Convention, art. 25(2) (a).
468. Id., art. 25(2) (b).
469. Id., art. 25(2) (c). These provisions first appeared in the German Convention, art.
XVII(3).
470. 1967 Convention, art. 25(4).
471. Hearings 35.
472. France § 13/7; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6511(b) (1).
473. OECD Draft Commentary 12.
474. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 to -2 (1968).
475. 1967 Convention, art. 26(1) & (3).
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personal service income where exemption from withholding has been
secured.476 However, it is unlikely that the income reported by French
permanent establishments in the United States will be transmitted as
a routine matter.
In exchanging information neither contracting state shall be required
to carry out administrative measures which are not permitted in both
states, to supply particulars not obtainable in both states, or to supply
information which would disclose trade or public secrets.477 Thus, the
exchange of information is limited to the lowest common denominator of
information that would be available to the fiscal authorities of both
states if they had jurisdiction over the particular individual possessing
the information. This is a somewhat more stringent requirement than
existed under the old convention. Under that convention, one contracting
state was not required to supply particulars not procurable under its own
domestic law, but there was no right to refuse to supply information not
procurable by the domestic law of the recipient state." ' Furthermore,
there was a specification of the material that would be supplied in the
ordinary course relating to both income and estate taxes. In particular,
the following information with respect to income taxes would have been
supplied under the old convention: information on persons with an ad-
dress in France deriving rents, dividends, interest, royalties, income from
trust, salaries, wages, bonuses, pensions, annuities, or other fixed or de-
terminable periodic income from sources within the United States,47 9 and
particulars relating to assets belonging to persons with French addresses
that could have been obtained from banks or similar institutions. 480 The
first class of items constitutes the income upon which withholding is
required under United States domestic law.4 ' France will transmit vir-
tually the same information to the United States under the new conven-
tion. 82 These items of information will probably continue to be furnished
automatically. It is particularly easy for the United States to transmit
these items of information, as the withholding lists are now on magnetic
tape in many cases. In this area, development by the OECD of a common
form for reporting routine exchange items would be a useful project for
it to undertake.
The new convention also provides for the non-routine exchange of in-
formation in particular cases.483 No regular procedure has been estab-
476. Third Tax Convention 211.
477. 1967 Convention, art. 26(2).
478. 1945 Convention Supplementary Protocol, art. 8(2).
479. Id., art. 9(1)(a).
480. Id., art. 9(1)(c).
481. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1441(a) & 1442(a).
482. 1945 Convention Supplementary Protocol, art. 10(3).
483. 1967 Convention, art. 26(3).
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lished for this type of exchange. This type of provision has been used
quite sparingly as the United States receives less than one hundred
specific requests a year, with more than one-half of these coming from
Canada.
C. Assistance in Collection
In most cases, there is little problem in collecting taxes from persons
abroad.485 When a taxpayer resisted payment and the country desiring
payment was a convention partner, the United States could have invoked
the assistance in collection provision of the old convention. 8 0 The new
convention makes no change in this article, which provoked a consider-
able dispute the last time it was considered, and, as a result, was some-
what watered down at that time.'
The contracting states under the new convention promise to lend
assistance to each other in the collection of taxes on income (including
interest, cost, and non-penal fines) where the taxes are definitely due
under the law of the state making the request 4 8  However, no assistance
will be provided with respect to citizens or corporations of the state upon
whom the request is made.489 This exception was added from fear that
the full panoply of United States collection measures, including jeopardy
assessments, would be imposed after a foreign determination (either
provisional or final) that might not comport with United States stan-
dards of due process and under procedures unfamiliar to United States
persons.490 Especially objectionable was the fact that the United States
government would have no discretion as to whether the particular
enforcement method should be applied in any individual case 4 1 as it
does under its domestic law.492 This objection could easily be cured by
redrafting the clause. The exclusion of citizens and corporations of the
United States from the provision demonstrates chauvinism. However, it
484. Interview with Henry Driscoll, Office of International Operations, Internal Revenue
Service, June 3, 1969.
485. For a good summary of the reasons, see Whitman, Tax Collection from Estates of
Nonresidents, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1049, 1051-52 (1968).
486. It has been contended that this provision has fallen into complete desuetude. 77 Harv.
L. Rev. 1327, 1330 (1964).
487. S. Exec. Rep. No. 7, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-9 (1948).
488. 1967 Convention, art. 27(1).
489. Id., art. 27(5).
490. Hearings on Exec. Doc. A Before the Subcomn. on the Convention with France on
Double Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34,
38-39, 41, 45, 73, 115-17, 167-68 (1947).
491. Id. at 34, 38-39, 116, 168.
492. This interpretation is gathered from the use of the directory word "will," which
requires the Internal Revenue Service to use its complete collection arsenal in every case.
If the word '"may" were used, some administrative discretion would be retained.
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does not demonstrate concern for arriving at a workable clause. It can be
contended that citizens and corporations of France cannot complain of
unfair French procedures, but what of their juxtaposition with more
stringent United States enforcement? 493 Furthermore, what of citizens
and corporations of third countries? If the convention provision is
subject to abuse, it is more likely to be abused with respect to for-
eigners.494 The exception, of course, largely negates the effectiveness of
the provision, though it can still be used with regard to French citizens
residing in the United States.
A second exception, of relatively little significance, confines the assist-
ance in collection provision only to taxes covered by the convention.95
This would exclude such taxes as turnover taxes, 49 0 employer's taxes,"'
local taxes,498 various excise taxes,499 the gift tax,00 and certain registra-
tion taxes. 501 The succession tax is covered by an identical provision found
in the estate tax convention between France and the United States.02
The 1967 Convention does not contain the clause usually found in tax
convention collection provisions, which permits each country to refuse en-
forcement for reasons of public policy.503 However, the lack of such a
clause does not seem to have resulted in more enforcement than in con-
ventions having such a clause. 0 4
The new convention specifically provides two different types of assist-
ance, based on the status of the claim. If the claim has not been finally
493. Hearings 73.
494. Note, International Enforcement of Tax Claims, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 490, 495 (1950),
claims that the discrimination against citizens and corporations is necessary to avoid destroy-
ing the provisions, and is justified because each country must take care of its own citizens.
The first contention is inaccurate, since it will only be by chance that a citizen of a third state
will be caught; the second contention is more cynical than rational.
495. 1967 Convention, art. 27(1). Some tax conventions with the same wording are further
limited by reservations to the conventions made by the United States Senate. The purpose of
the reservations was to assure that the exemptions or rate reductions were not abused.
E.g., South Africa Protocol, art. VIII, supplementing, South Africa Convention, art. XV.
496. See generally France §§ 14/1.1-4.1.
497. See generally id. §§ 4/2.1-.7.
498. See generally id. §§ 14/4.1-15/5.7.
499. See generally id. §§ 4/3.1-15.
500. See generally id. §§ 3/3.1-.2.
501. See generally id. §§ 3/4.1-.6e.
502. See generally id. §§ 3/2.1-.10. The administrative provisions of the old convention
applied to both the income tax and estate tax convention. They are terminated by the 1967
Convention only to the extent that they relate to the income tax convention.
503. See, e.g., United Kingdom Convention Supplementary Protocol, art. XIXA(2). For
a discussion of its significance, see Note, International Enforcement of Tax Claims, 50 Colum.
L. Rev. 490, 499-500 (1950).
504. Assistance in collection has generally been confined to a letter of Inquiry from tile
Internal Revenue Service. Interview with Nathan Gordon, Director, Office of Int'l Tax Affairs,
Dep't of the Treasury, May 26, 1969.
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determined, the conservatory provisions will be used. 05 On the other
hand, if the claim has been finally determined, the full collection facilities
will be used. 0 6 This requires in each case a definition of the term "finally
determined." The best interpretation of the term would be to require
that the case be settled beyond appeal in the foreign country, either by
decision of its highest court or administrative body capable of hearing
the case, or by expiration of the time for appeal or the applicable statute
of limitations.5 °7 To take the view that a non-final administrative assess-
ment is a final determination is nonsensical. Until the assessment becomes
final, the provisions for conservancy should be sufficent to secure the
payment of the tax. This view is strengthened by the fact that in both
contracting states, there are procedures for securing a final determination
of the entire controversy before the tax need be paid. 0 8 The new con-
vention, in addition, mandates the full use of the jurisdiction's power to
collect the tax. This will generally include resort to both the judiciary
and administrative measures. 09
Although the available assistance in collection provisions have rarely
been used, they serve to provide tools that will be available in case of
later need. The very existence of such provisions may also encourage
voluntary cooperation. It is likely that a stronger clause could be se-
cured by making enforcement discretionary with the requested country
and by formulating a policy statement as to the types of circumstances
(for common cases) in which the Treasury Department would exercise
such discretion. The fact that these changes, which would make a
stronger provision acceptable to the Senate, have not been made probably
indicates that the problem, in practice, is not pressing.
D. Exchange of Texts
The new convention adds a provision that requires the competent
authorities to exchange texts of any changes in the domestic tax laws
covered by article 1510 and any published material interpreting the con-
505. 1967 Convention, art. 27(4).
506. Id., art. 27(2).
507. Contra, Note, International Enforcement of Tax Claims, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 490,
498 (1950).
508. France § 13/4.4b.
509. For a discussion of French possibilities, see France § 13/10.1, at 951. For a discussion
of United States procedures, see Note, International Enforcement of Tax Claims, 50 Colum.
L. Rev. 490, 500-04 (1950). One of the limitations on enforcement of foreign judgments
normally is the rule on recognition of foreign judgments used in the enforcing state. Id. at
496-97.
510. 1967 Convention, art. 30(1). No information need be exchanged with respect to taxes
covered by the convention but not specified in Article 1. See notes 15 & 16 supra and accom-
panying text. Nor does it appear that copies of legislative hearings or legislative committee
reports need be exchanged, as the clause only specifies "texts of amendments or new statutes."
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vention. 11 This requirement will no doubt be fulfilled by the United
States by sending the Internal Revenue Bulletin to France, along with
any judicial decisions relating to convention interpretation. 12 While this
provision will be useful, it would be more useful for each contracting
state to undertake the preparation of an annual memorandum to the
other contracting state setting forth all changes in its domestic law and
convention interpretation that would be of significance to the convention
partner. This would eliminate the necessity of going through a mass of
material to find appropriate provisions, and then trying to determine their
significance in the context of the other country's domestic tax law.
Although most foreign tax administrations lack the personnel to comply
with such a provision, the United States does not. Indeed, most of the
convention partners of the United States are not religious in supplying
the required documents. 18
E. Extension and Change of the Convention
As to extension, the new convention contains provisions that would
permit its extension to overseas territories of France. 14 The new con-
vention also contains provisions which permit minor changes in the con-
vention that conform to its spirit and changes in the internal law of one
or both of the contracting states to be effectuated by an exchange of
notes, rather than by a supplementary convention. 15 The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee had been informed, prior to the promulgation of
the new convention, that in the past, when there had been territorial
extensions by exchange of notes, the extension had been submitted to the
Senate for its approval, and that the same procedure would be followed
in case of similar changes under the new convention."' This information
satisfied neither the Foreign Relations Committee 1" nor the full Senate,
since that body made approval by it of convention changes or convention
extension by exchange of notes a specific requirement of its approval of
the 1967 Convention.51 8
511. 1967 Convention, art. 30(2). Presumably this provision, no matter how persuasive,
would not qualify. The clause reads: "shall exchange the texts of all published material inter-
preting the present Convention under their respective laws, whether in the form of regulations,
rulings, or judicial decisions." This seems to exclude nonofficial writings. The reference to
rulings should be sufficient to include revenue procedures and technical information releases.
512. Interview with Mr. Harold Warrington, Office of International Affairs, Internal
Revenue Service, June 3, 1969.
513. Id.
514. 1967 Convention, art. 29(1).
515. Id., art. 30(3).
516. S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1968).
517. Id. at S.




This article has attempted to analyze the provisions of the 1967 Con-
vention, particularly those provisions that are likely to be utilized in sub-
sequent income tax conventions negotiated by the United States. There-
fore, it is appropriate to summarize the particular types of provisions
that are likely to continue in our treaty relations with other countries,
and to suggest areas where the treaty clauses could be improved.
Some of the provisions of the 1967 Convention were inserted solely
because of a specific provision of French law or strong French public
policy. Thus, the special provision relating to the branch profits tax, '
and insurance agencies as permanent establishments,520 are not likely to
be repeated in future tax conventions.
The 1967 Convention was the first full new tax convention negotiated
with a developed country after approval of the OECD Draft. In general,
the new convention conforms to that document. In particular, the sub-
stance of the OECD Draft is incorporated even where its particular
terms are not. Deviation from the OECD Draft occurs particularly where
that model is silent or ambiguous. 21 The 1967 Convention supplies in-
terpretation and specificity in many areas, and will be a model for the
future.
The 1967 Convention is less successful in dealing with the interrela-
tionship of the United States with a country using an integrated tax
system for dividends where the relief is given through a credit to the
shareholder. Originally, the convention provided almost no relief by
adhering to the provisions of the OECD Draft, which are not designed
to meet this situation. A later amendment provided relief for United
States shareholders of French corporations, thereby eliminating part of
of the discrimination. However, no relief was provided for French share-
holders of United States corporations which would put them on a par
with their brethren holding shares of Gallic firms. This was due partly
from French reluctance to encourage the investment of French capital
abroad, and partly from the novelty of the solutions required to achieve
neutrality.522 Whichever reason underlies the situation, an improved
method is needed for dealing with integrated tax countries. Fortunately,
there are few countries with integrated tax systems.
Matching the United States credit method of relief from double taxa-
tion with the French exemption method was not difficult. France was
willing to accept a convention system based largely on the credit sys-
519. See text accompanying notes 232-60 supra.
520. See text accompanying notes 184-88 supra.
521. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 50-51 & 155-58 supra.
522. See text accompanying notes 270-85 supra.
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tern."23 Other countries in the future may not be so obliging. In addition,
French domestic law provides that where taxing jurisdiction is allocated
to France by convention, domestic taxing jurisdiction will expand to
include items otherwise exempted from French tax. 24 Thus, the inter-
section of the credit and exemption methods does not produce lacunae
that might otherwise result in fiscal evasion.
Perhaps the most significant change in the 1967 Convention is the
taxation at source of royalties up to a limit of 5 percent12Y A number of
foreign countries have unfavorable balances of royalties payments with
the United States. If every country whose balance was as poor as France
insisted on source taxation of royalties, this would immediately become
a general principle in United States tax conventions. While this would
bring the taxation of royalties into line with principles used for taxing
interest, it represents a substantial change that affects a great deal of
revenue.
A second important achievement of the 1967 Convention is the in-
corporation of motion picture royalties within the definition of business
profits.52 The Convention will permit the movie industry, which earns
large sums abroad, to arrange its business in an advantageous tax
fashion. The United States will press for a similar provision in all future
tax conventions and cite as precedent the 1967 Convention.
In addition to the benefits afforded the contracting parties, the 1967
Convention will serve as a model for the drafting of future conventions
and provide a standard for their interpretation.
523. See text accompanying notes 427-50 supra.
524. France § 11/4.18, at 843.
525. See text accompanying notes 322-27 supra.
526. See text accompanying notes 112-21 supra.
